The stipulation creates duality of supreme laws, meaning the country is currently under the rule of at least two constitutions that are the newly promulgated charter and the interim charter of 2014.

The clause, which allows the use of Article 44 under the interim charter, has been contentious since the charter was publicised last year.

Nitirat, a group of law academics mostly from Thammasat University, had said in its statement against the draft charter during the referendum campaign last year that the licence to absolute power undermined all essential principles in the charter, especially the chapter on rights and liberties.

With such power, Nitirat said the ruling National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) junta could still maintain its capability to infringe on the people’s rights. And people who suffered this would not be able to take legal action against the violation because the constitution legalised all actions brought under the absolute power.

Worst-case scenarios pointed out by some Nitirat academics included postponement of an election using the capacity of Article 44.

However, Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC) chairman Meechai Ruchupan responded to the concern about Article 265 in the provisional clause as a means for the junta to retain power. He said it was necessary, as it would be impossible for the NCPO to rule until the next government took office without that power.

Accordingly, it could be said that the country has now remained under authoritarian rule although many people might mistake promulgation of the new charter as a faint sign that democratic rule would resume.

This is not to mention the fact that the provision clauses in the new charter also pave the way for a |five-year transitional period that will keep the coup-maker’s legacy alive for the next 20 years.

The provision clauses authorise the junta-appointed Senate to also play a significant role in determining the prime minister/s in the first five years after the election. But given each government has a tenure of four years, the stipulated number of five years means that the Senate could partly determine prime ministers for the next eight years – or two government tenures.

For another, the new charter prescribes a strict rule that future elected governments must follow the reform and national strategies initiated by the coup-makers. Failing to do so may cost their legitimacy in office as the junta-appointed Senate is also authorised to hold that government accountable in this matter.

Despite such questionable rules, the elected government might as well forget about amending the canon to turn everything around because the junta-appointed charter drafters also ensured that the amendment could not be done easily.

It would also take one third of the Senate to approve the amendment both in the first and the last readings in addition to having approval from at least 20 per cent of MPs of every opposition party in the Parliament.