Some observers anticipate that this week’s 28th and 29th Asean Summits will finally yield a unified resolution on the territory disputes from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, several of whose members are claimants.

They will be disappointed.

The presence in Laos of world leaders like US President Barack Obama and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang will generate headlines, but no solution per se to the region’s No 1 security issue.

Asean member-countries Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam have been at loggerheads with China over longstanding overlapping territory claims in the troubled sea.

The regional grouping fears losing its so-called “centrality” in the regional security architecture if it fails to declare its position on the disputes. While its members struggle to define their “common interest” in the sea, leaders in the bloc feel they must speak with one voice on the issue. But so far they have stopped short at merely raising their “concerns” over the situation, wary of stepping into a territory so fraught with tension.

While finding common ground in affirming freedom of navigation and the need for peaceful resolution in accordance with international law, individual members of the grouping each harbour different national interests in their dealings with China.

Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, which are not claimants in the disputes, enjoy close economic bonds with China that benefit their development as well as regional integration and connectivity.

Thailand has leant on China for support after international criticism over the 2014 coup. The military-backed government sees Beijing as a major ally in its efforts to boost a sluggish economy, although a joint train deal is still in limbo. The military is also mulling deals with China to diversify its hardware and equipment. Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan says a Bt36-billion submarine deal will be completed before the junta leaves office.

Laos and Cambodia rely on Chinese assistance, trade and investment and have never hid where their national interests lie. Beijing has also made clear its readiness to exercise influence over these countries whenever Asean pushes for a collective voice on the South China Sea.

It would be a big surprise if Asean even made public mention of the recent Permanent Court of Arbitration verdict against China’s claim in the South China Sea.

Beijing has made clear that it will not deal with Asean collectively over the territory spats and instead favours a country-by-country approach. For China, any “meddling” by Asean or other “outside” powers, notably the United States, would complicate the issue.

The Philippines, under the leadership of the maverick Rodrigo Duterte, might prefer Beijing’s approach and find a way to make bilateral deal.

Meanwhile if fellow claimant Vietnam can also find ways to deal with China over the disputes, it might be unnecessary for Asean to speak up on the contentious issue.

The remaining task for Asean in its bid for “centrality”, is to focus on establishing a code of conduct for the South China Sea.

That job is not easy, either.

Asean has decades of experience in forging such codes with China. The current instrument, called the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and signed in 2002, was the result of long diplomatic struggling. It eventually became a non-binding accord thanks to pressure from Beijing. The attempt to replace it with a genuine and legally binding code began in 2011. Five years later, the group his yet to produce even a single draft of a new code of conduct for the South China Sea.