First, is this project – estimated by Thai authorities to cost Bt170 billion and by Chinese authorities Bt190 billion – redundant with the State Railway of Thailand’s ongoing project to build the double-track railroad? Or is it workable since both are on the same route?

Previously, the Thai-Chinese project was supposed to be more than 800km long, running from Bangkok to Nakhon Ratchasima and then to Nong Khai province near the border with Laos. It would have linked up with Laos’ standard-gauge track, which would then have connected with China’s railway system.

Thailand proposed to China to form a joint venture for this Bt500-billion-plus scheme. China then requested the right to develop properties along the route and train stations plus other conditions, which were not acceptable to Thailand.

After last week’s meeting with China’s Premier Li Keqiang in Hainan, Thai Prime Minister PrayutChan-o-cha announced Thailand would invest solely in the project’s first-phase – from Bangkok to Nakhon Ratchasima – while suspending other sections of the project.

The 352km first-phase route would use the 1.435-metre standard-gauge track while the trains would travel at speeds of 250 km per hour and mainly serve passengers. At this stage, the Thai government will be the sole investor and will consider inviting private investors to operate the service under a contract.

The Thai Finance Ministry will be responsible for providing the sources of funds, while an environmental impact assessment is underway.

On connectivity with Laos and China, Thai authorities said passengers and cargo could use the one-metre gauge double railroads from Nakhon Ratchasima to Nong Khai – and then switch to the 1.435-metre standard gauge track in Laos and China.

Under this plan, construction of the first-phase Bangkok-Nakhon Ratchasima route could start in August or September of this year.

Another issue is whether Thailand should call international bidding for this project since the Thai government will wholly invest in the scheme.

Previously, Thailand had signed a Framework of Cooperation with China on December 3, 2015 to develop the project. It would be a diplomatic fiasco if China’s high-speed train technology was not used and there was international bidding.

After all, Thailand is already working on a multi-billion-baht double-track railroad expansion on the Bankok-Nakhon Ratchasima and other related routes.

Double-track trains will travel at a higher speed of 100-120 km/h, much faster than today’s low speed on single tracks.

Economically, high-speed trains travelling at 250 km/h are going to be expensive as only 20,000 passengers are expected to use them per day on the Bangkok-Nakhon Ratchasima route when it is operational.

Such a high-speed service is not economically feasible for cargo transport either, so the service would face significant losses for years to come.

In addition, it will not generate significant property and other development along the route since the planned high-speed trains are going to be on the existing route from Bangkok to the northeastern province.

In terms of connectivity with neighbouring countries, the system will not work due to the different size of rail tracks, so it’s better for Thailand to focus on implementing the double-track railroads at this stage.

Any high-speed train project should be implemented at a later date.

The result could not only yield the adoption of the controversial charter but also give justification to the junta that is backing the draft.

The new constitution draft is now complete and ready for public release before it is submitted to a referendum in early August.

Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC) chairman Meechai Ruchupan recently said the draft – with its 17 chapters and 279 sections – could serve to both manage crises and curb corruption. He said it follows the blueprint drawn up by the ruling National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) – seen in Article 35 of the 2014 interim charter – and the recent controversial proposals from the so-called “four rivers of power” including the Cabinet.

The new proposed political structure now covers the single-ballot system; the qualifications of electoral candidates (and the grounds for their disqualification); the parliamentary structure, including 250 non-elected senators during the transitional period; and the powers of the independent organisations and the Constitutional Court. Other rules are included to make sure the majority government, elected by voters from across the country, is held in check. The “balances”, however, are still highly in question.

As much as the CDC assured its independence, the ruling coup-makers stood their ground while denying they sought to retain power after the promised general election. However, it should be noted that the political structure delivered by this charter draft would not be unusual compared to other post-coup periods.

The 1978 Constitution, sponsored by the coup-makers led by Admiral Sa-ngad Chaloryu, provided a similar parliamentary composition with a fully appointed Senate as powerful as the elected MPs. The consequences, however, were not very rosy and the bloodshed in 1992 was in part a legacy of that political structure, which led to coup-maker General Suchinda Kraprayoon to become prime minister in the semi-democratic era following the 1978 charter.

The tragedy of 1992, in blood and lives, proved the society’s intolerance of an undemocratic outsider prime minister.

Today, more than two decades later, Thais are being tested again, this time by the current regime and its proposed canon – and whether the document has enough of the spirit of democracy, if any at all.

Thus, this upcoming referendum – asking whether the junta-sponsored charter should be accepted and adopted as the country’s supreme law – is decisive and promises to be another significant milestone in Thai history.

If it passes the plebiscite, a similar post-coup political structure would re-emerge – which could lead to discontent and upheaval as in 1992. At the same time, the coup and the junta’s seizure of power would also be automatically endorsed.

To elaborate: Success in the referendum could mean that society thinks coup d’etats are acceptable and approves of a constitution in which the people played no part in the drafting. More importantly, it could mean that the military is authorised to seize power and tear up a constitution, as long as it can convince people it could write a new and better one.

On the contrary, if the charter is killed in the referendum, it will be a slap to the face of the current regime. Doubts would be raised if it were only the charter draft that people turned down – or were the charter’s sponsors who are currently ruling the country rendering a questionable performance?

Defeat would mean that voters had turned sour on the charter. The whole regime backing the draft would feel the effects.

Either way, the outcome of the plebiscite will reveal which side of the political spectrum the majority of society is leaning towards. And perhaps it will be a wake-up call to the key leaders of the losing side who will have to sit down and rethink their battle strategy once again.

The company, which is owned by Jasmine International Plc (JAS), failed to meet the deadline on Monday for a Bt8.04 billion payment on a licence to operate the 4G mobile network on the 900MHz spectrum. This was despite the fact that it had won the bid with a historic offer of Bt75.65 billion in December last year. Yet few observers were surprised by the company’s no-show.

Its default has not only stopped JAS from becoming the country’s fourth 4G mobile network operator, it has also lost its cash guarantee of Bt645 million, though a company executive recently reported to the Stock Exchange of Thailand that this would not affect its financial status.

However, many people are wondering why JAS bid so high and then defaulted on the payment. JAS shares have fluctuated in the past three months over rumours that it might seek a business partner, as well as a public announcement related to its dividend payout and share buy-back programme.

Meanwhile, when an auction fails, it is repeated without considering any figures obtained from the previous bid. Any winning bidder that misses the payment deadline either loses its cash guarantee or faces compensation claims.

This auction, however, was different because there were two sets of 900MHz spectra up for bids. One was won by True Corp via its subsidiary at the offered price of Bt76.3 billion, while the other was won by JAS.

The fact that the National Broadcasting and Telecommunication Commission (NBTC) had to ask for Article 44 to be invoked in order to help it choose between arranging a new auction with a start price close to JAS’s winning bid or give the licence to the second highest bidder indicates that the price may have been a bit too high. However, the regulator has ended up scheduling the next auction for June and setting the starting price at JAS’s winning bid because of the government’s say so.

Observers now believe that few will be able to join the new auction because the starting price is far too high.

Bidders, on the other hand, make their offers based on the information they have, and should be willing and prepared to meet their winning bid.

As for JAS, even if it is sued for compensation of Bt170 million, which is the gap between the original bid and the bid the NBTC expects in a future auction, it would not be worth it when compared to the loss of opportunity and time, as well as the lowering of the licence’s value and delay to people accessing 4G.

So in order to avoid a recurrence of the “winner’s curse” – when the bid winner backs out – should the NBTC demand bigger cash deposits or add more rules to ensure bids are handled more efficiently?

There was a problem with the system’s shunting device somewhere between Chit Lom and Siam stations in the city’s business and shopping district.

The system transports as many as 700,000 passengers per day, and the problem led to a massive pileup of commuters on BTS platforms. Long queues formed outside of stations, worsening traffic congestion throughout the city. The problem was solved by the following day and luckily did not affect passenger safety.

Just over a week later, on March 5, another incident happened in Bangkok’s mass transit system. A fire broke out on a commuter boat running along Saen Saeb canal, leaving many passengers injured. It was discovered that the fire was caused by an LNG leak. Fortunately, there were no fatalities.

Less than a month later, a new problem hit yet another transit system last Monday. The Suvarnabhumi Airport Rail Link was disabled by a power outage that caused a train to stop midway between two stations. Rising heat and a lack of fresh air inside the carriage prompted many passengers to exit the train and walk along the tracks to the next station. Some were treated by medical staff after they fainted. Luckily, again, there were no injuries.

Three incidents during a course of less than a month – and passengers involved have to thank only their luck that there were no severe injuries or fatalities. The question is: How long can we commuters rely on luck alone while using public transport services?

Regarding the BTS glitch, there still has been no clear explanation why the shunting problem happened. Was it caused by the system or human error? And will a problem like this happen again?

Regarding the commuter boat service on Klong Saen Saeb, regular passengers must be well informed of all relevant safety concerns, involving over-capacity passenger loads and unsafe boat conditions, among others. Authorities may have banned boats that are powered by LNG, but it remains unclear if other safety concerns have been addressed.

Regarding the Airport Rail Link, executives in charge of the system have admitted that a major maintenance overhaul is overdue. Such an overhaul is required after 1.2 million kilometres of service – but the system has logged more than 1.6 million kilometres without major maintenance.

Executives explained that partial maintenance projects were performed regularly but they could not afford a major overhaul.

They seemed to be saying that partial maintenance was sufficient, although that certainly goes against the maintenance manual.

They plan the next major maintenance when the system reaches 2.4 million kilometres, doubling the suggested distance travelled before servicing. The decision is not so reassuring.

That approach seems to be how the country’s mass transit system is being run generally. And it explains why many city residents opt to commute in their own cars and ignore the much cheaper option of public transport altogether.

It is because nobody can be sure they will continue to be lucky while using the problem-fraught public transport system?

 

This situation has become clear after China’s contacts with the other five countries along the river – Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.

Physically, about half the nearly 5,000-kilometre length of the Mekong is under Chinese sovereignty, flowing through three provinces in China before continuing southward to the delta in southern Vietnam.

It is no exaggeration to say that China utilises more of the river than all the five other countries combined. While China has built six hydropower dams in the mainstream over the past two decades – and many more are planned – downstream countries like Laos are constructing two projects in the mainstream and other countries are merely pumping water for agriculture.

While China began clearing rapids, reefs and islets to facilitate river navigation more than 15 years ago, countries downstream rarely used the Mekong for transportation. Chinese fleets regularly provided their service for passengers and goods between its southern ports and Thailand’s Chiang Saen. Thailand, Laos and Myanmar used only small rowboats or long-tail boats for local transportation.

The Mekong has been under Chinese development strategy for decades. In the late 1980s, Beijing first commissioned southwestern provincial authorities to engage with countries in the Mekongbasin. China’s push for development has never been interrupted since then. As the Chinese economy keeps growing, so does its political power.

Beijing took over the Asian Development Bank-sponsored Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) in 2002, when the group had the first summit of its leaders in Phnom Penh. Financial sources for infrastructure development were consecutively diverted from Japanese-led banks to Chinese financial institutions.

The Mekong basin waterways were mainly regulated by the Mekong River Commission (MRC). The MRC’s rules to regulate the waterways are imperfect, but they are better than nothing and apply only to Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Upstream countries China and Myanmar are merely dialogue partners but have more liberty to utilise the river.

There is no mechanism for all Mekong riparian countries to discuss the impact of development projects in China since the existing international cooperation frameworks do not cover it. GMS has focused only on economic development, while the MRC does not cover China.

There has been no opportunity for the six countries to discuss issues such as the consequences of development projects on environment – and social and security problems such as smuggling and trafficking.

Beijing initiated a new forum called the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism in 2014. Lancang is the Chinese name for the Mekong. Although it is the same river, Beijing insisted on its version of the name being used for the forum to impose the Chinese identity in engaging with countries in the basin.

The move was very fast, perhaps too fast, for other countries in the basin to deal with. The Lancang-Mekong had its first ministerial meeting in Jinghong, China, last November. Beijing called the first summit this week in Sanya, Hainan, to firmly establish the new cooperation.

As a Chinese senior diplomat said recently, every matter could be discussed in the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation summit, including environmental and social troubles along the Mekong River.

Beijing has known for a long time that its development projects – notably dams in the Mekongmainstream – are troublesome for the region. Last week, Chinese diplomats informed their counterparts in the lower Mekong basin of their decision to discharge water from the Jinghong dam at double the usual rate released in the dry season.

It’s rare for the Chinese to inform downstream countries of moves like this. It would not have happened unless Vietnam pushed last week, as China was preparing for a Hainan summit. Hanoi hailed the decision, as it needed the fresh water to push back seawater in the delta.

Thailand’s residents along the river were not expected to respond well to the notification at such short notice. It threatens to seriously impact their fishery, agriculture and tourism earnings.

However, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who seems to know nothing about the Mekong, expressed his gratitude to China.

The plan, the OEC hopes, will lay down a sound direction for Thailand’s educational development over the next 15 years. But the problem is, even if the OEC comes up with a really good plan, there is no guarantee that it will be implemented in full.

OEC secretary-general Dr Kamol Rodklai himself reckons that relevant authorities have in the past usually implemented an average of only 15 per cent of previous educational plans.

That percentage is quite depressing, as Thailand has been developing new educational plans for implementation since 1932.

In practice, these plans should have been constantly improving the country’s educational services over the past several decades – if all relevant parties had seriously embraced them.

Does the failure to seriously implement plans contribute to the country’s poor quality of education today?

For his part, Kamol believes that there is a link between the failure of implementation and the failure in our schools.

In his opinion, all relevant parties should be implementing at least 80 per cent of any given plan in order to improve the quality of education significantly.

In recent decades, Thai schools, Thai students and Thai teachers have all been widely criticised for their less-than-impressive performance. Mathayom 6 students, on average, barely score 50 per cent in national educational tests.

Kamol described the 12th national educational plan, which the OEC is still in the process of the refining, as the “new educational charter for Thailand”.

If everyone were to comply with this charter, Kamol said, Thai graduates over the next 15 years would acquire the skills that will help them to do well in the 21st century.

“We aim to equip students with skills that will ensure they adjust well to changing technologies, the economy and social conditions,” he said.

After an ad hoc committee of the OEC completed drafting the new national educational plan, the OEC presented it at a public forum yesterday to start gathering opinions from relevant parties.

Deputy Prime Minister Prajin Juntong also showed up at the event to endorse the importance of the new national educational plan.

“It’s as important as the constitution because this plan is going to lay down the foundation for the country between 2016 and 2031,” Prajin said.

Before the plan is implemented, the OEC will hold public forums in all four regions of Thailand to gather opinions from all sides.

“We will listen to opinions and pay attention to recommendations,” Kamol said. “We aim to improve the plan even further for the benefit of all.”

Education Minister General Dapong Ratanasuwan said yesterday that he was also aware that too many educational plans had been ignored in the past.

Therefore, he said, he hoped relevant authorities would perform better to ensure that this new education plan would be implemented.

Let’s hope that Dapong can actually achieve his goal in terms of implementation – failing that goal would mean that a national educational plan is nothing more than a pile of paper.

No matter how hard-working the plan’s drafters are, they will have no impact on improving the national education system unless there is a real will to implement the plan’s provisions.

Perhaps Thailand’s new education plan should be implemented in three stages, the way that Malaysia’s national educational plan has been phased in. At each stage, Malaysia identifies clear goals, which means that at the end of each phase, if goals have not been achieved, relevant agencies can review their performance and be held accountable for failures.

The drafters of this educational plan, and future plans as well, must realise that they need to address basic, essential issues at once. It is one thing to say that the educational system should equip Thais with 21st-century skills, but that promise means nothing if millions will still fail a basic literacy test.

That practice contradicts what is stated in the Environmental Promotion and Protection Act.

The preparation for a project before it has received an EIA could proceed with Cabinet endorsement.

It appeared Prayut realised the negative implications of the order after it was issued. He said he had instructed the government’s spokesperson team to explain the details of the order to the press for fear the public could misunderstand what the government was trying to achieve.

Government Spokesman Sansern Kaewkamnerd stressed the point, saying the EIA and the environmental and health impact assessment (EHIA) would not be bypassed by the order.

“The government will not allow the economy to override the environment, and we will not take the EIA/EHIA as a ritual to rubber-stamp projects,” he said. “The PM as such has stressed that if the EIA/EHIA has failed, the concerned projects must be dropped accordingly,” Sansern told the Nation.

He pleaded for understanding of the government’s reasoning for trying to shore up sluggish economic growth via this order issuance.

But the public, who have experienced a long fight to improve the health of people and the environment, especially those working in civil sectors, are not convinced one bit.

They have been stepping up campaigns, not only against this latest order but the whole bunch of orders issued under the absolute power afforded the NCPO chief, Prayut, under Article 44 of the interim constitution.

The public scepticism about the latest order was aired at a public forum organised by major environmental networks yesterday.

Based on years of experience, Weerawat Theeraprasart, the former chairman of the EHIA-screening Independent Commission on Environment and Health, said assessing a project’s impact on the environment or people’s health could not run in parallel with a its preparation but must be a pre-condition of it being approved. That ensures projects are thoroughly scrutinised first to stop irreparable damage being done to the environment and/or people’s health, Weerawat said.

This particularly makes sense for the types of projects addressed in the order, ranging from transportation infrastructure to irrigation facilities, because these projects are large scale, and could have wide-ranging negative implications for the environment and/or people’s health, he said.

By being able to endorse projects before their EIA/EHIA reports are completed, the NCPO has given the economy propriety over the environment, and what will follow will be increased pressure coming from every direction to get the reports passed – even from the government, he said.

He said that would cause fierce confrontations occurring in designated development areas, something the military would not wish to see.

Besides what they said would be the wide-ranging negative implications for the environment and so-called peace assurance, environmental advocates believe the order is tantamount to the apparent enforcement against the will of the people.

The EIA and EHIA, they said, are the result of years fighting and a social evolution to generate room for public participation in development proposals and the thorough consideration of matters important to their lives.

With one order, they believe this long evolution and the will of the people have been side-tracked in a manner similar to what has happened to their democracy.

They said it would result growing calls for Article 44 to be scrapped.

I could not agree more after listening to the debate since the order was issued, and I see no need to justify my argument any more.

To ensure that conflicts will not break out over this decision, it is not too late for the government to take time out to contemplate the issue, or even correct what may have gone wrong, as the powers-that-be should care most about good governance for the sake of their own people.

However, Chavalit was quick to deny that his latest move was politically motivated.

“I have never relied on anyone or their money. I left Pheu Thai after Thaksin told me in a Skype chat to bring the Shinawatras, the Damapongs and the Wongsawats into the party,” Chavalit said, referring to three families Thaksin is related to by blood or marriage.

Chavalit, a retired Army general who once led a party called New Aspiration, joined Pheu Thai in 2009 and left two years later.

Speaking to the media at his home recently, Chavalit said he has no interest in whether Thaksinreturns or not. “Conflicts still exist and I have no power to bring him back,” he added.

Thaksin fled Thailand just before the Supreme Court sentenced him in absentia to two years in jail in 2008 for abuse of power. He also faces other charges for dereliction of duty during his tenure as premier.

Yet judging from the recent speech he delivered in the United States, Thaksin appears to be convinced that “some power” will help him return as free man in the near future. Chavalit, however, disagrees—and his remarks could imply that Thaksin faces major problems.

For starters, Pheu Thai will certainly face an uphill task if it continues sticking with its goal to bring the “big boss” back as a free man. The party seems to have forgotten that when the last government it led passed the amnesty law, it prompted public outrage and months of street protests leading to a military coup in May 2014.

If Pheu Thai wins the next election and opts for the same path to try and help Thaksin, then the nightmare will return and Thaksin—who has been in self-exile overseas—will find himself in an even more difficult position.

Yet it looks like Thaksin still hasn’t given up his desire to return to power and possibly achieve his ultimate goal of ” “being prime minister for 20 years and becoming a statesman someday”.

In order to realise that goal, Thaksin still has to rely on the Shinawatra, Damapong and Wongsawat clans, though some members – his sister ex-PM Yingluck and brother-in-law ex-PM Somchai Wongsawat – are mired in legal problems.

Experience has taught Thaksin that he cannot rely on any nominee prime minister who does not come from one of these three clans. For instance, his proxy premier Samak Sundaravej brought him much disappointment. He could have returned home when Samak and the People Power Party ran the government, yet they did little to help him with his legal problems.

Clearly for Thaksin, blood is thicker than water, and members from any of the three families are certainly more reliable and trustworthy than outsiders.

Many political observers are convinced that Thaksin’s proxy Pheu Thai has a good chance of winning the next election, and the prime ministerial candidate is bound to be someone “closest to the big boss”.

However, it looks like Chavalit’s recent remark was a veiled warning to Thaksin that it may not be a good idea for him to continue relying on someone from one of the three clans. Now, let’s wait and see if Thaksin heeds what his old ally has to say.

This underscored the computer’s capability to further outsmart humans in complex tasks such as the complicated board game.

Previously, IBM’s Deep Blue computer defeated world chess champion Garry Kasparov.

Since the 1900s, when computers emerged in the form of tabulation; and the 1950s when computers were software-driven and static; to today’s era of machine-learning algorithms, AI is becoming more and more crucial to human life, especially in a context of human-machine collaboration.

In fact, AI, which includes cognitive computing, is already at work in healthcare and other fields in Thailand.

Bangkok’s Bumrungrad Hospital is a good example. It has been using IBM Watson for Oncology to treat cancer patients over the past year. How does the system work?

According to IBM scientists Gerald Tesauro and Murray Campbell, cognitive computing works in tandem with human doctors. At Bumrungrad, there are about 40 general cancer doctors who use the system to provide more accurate evidence-based treatment to patients in a timely fashion.

In the case of healthcare, IBM Watson will first analyse a patient’s medical records, using its advanced capabilities about the meaning and context of clinical notes and reports. It also takes into account key patient information written in plain English that may also be critical to selecting a treatment pathway.

Second, the system identifies potential evidence-based treatment options by combining attributes from the patient’s file with clinical expertise, external research and data – helping the doctor to make their decision more quickly and accurately.

Third, the system finds and provides supporting evidence from a wide variety of sources, and ranks them as supporting evidence for each option.

Overall, the system draws from a huge amount of information, called Big Data. It includes literature and rationales curated by MSK, a leading US cancer treatment centre, as well as more than 290 medical journals, more than 200 textbooks, and 12 million pages of text.

All these computing tasks can be done within a short time and can be replicated in other areas of work to benefit from the so-called augmented intelligence in which human and machine intelligence is combined to deliver faster and more accurate solutions.

This can be applied to medicine, education, banking, insurance, law, government, retailing, manufacturing and many other industries.

According to Tesauro and Campbell, cognitive computing which is now capable of addressing some “messy” real life issues, rather than just playing winners in board and other games, has the potential to transform industries and professions, leading to greater productivity, and more highly informed decision-making.

Prior to the advent of Google’s AlphaGo computer, IBM also succeeded in incorporating elements of AI, machine learning, deep question answering and natural language processing.

Its computer programme then played the American quiz show Jeopardy and beat the world’s best human players. But scientists like Campbell believe we are at least 50 years away from creating fully autonomous systems that manifest human-level cognitive faculties.

However, Campbell and Tesauro noted it’s now the time to increase the leverage of AI and human intelligence in a meaningful way to tackle more “messy” problems in real life.

While computers may not yet be as intelligent as humans, they can now compute web-scale data sets with cloud-scale computing power, and extract insights using highly sophisticated algorithms for machine learning.

The IBM scientists said that research efforts should also be shifted from the sci-fi fantasy of machines that fully replicate human general intelligence to more realistic development of collaborative machines that can work with humans.

This will make the best use of each other’s different strengths – as in the case of Dr Watson who works side by side online in real time with real-life doctors at Bumrungrad Hospital.

Campbell and Tesauro also shared the opinion that in the foreseeable future, it appears the challenges of a complex world will require a combination of people and machines working together toward a more productive and better world.

The idea was proposed by Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan and later supported by Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha.

The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) leaders claimed the proposal was aimed at ensuring the reform guidelines and national strategies formulated by the current government are fully implemented by the next administration. But critics saw it as an attempt to retain the junta’s power after an election.

The idea concerned people most especially when Prawit floated a “trial balloon” – saying that it was possible for NCPO members to be selected as senators. Some sources hinted that Prayut could become the Senate Speaker himself.

This special mechanism would be similar to the National Strategic Reform and Reconciliation Commission, or the so-called “crisis panel” that the NCPO asked former drafters to add in the charter draft last year that was later rejected.

Prayut‘s reason for the idea was that he was not sure whether politicians were ready to join hands to move the country forward.

“Please tell me if all of you [politicians] are ready. Who will guarantee it? Even though I hold the power now, they still fight these days. So I don’t know what will happen in the future,” Prayut said.

Judging from his remarks, Prayut was well aware he could not relinquish power, otherwise this latest coup would have been a waste.

Despite saying the idea was just his own personal opinion, Prayut and the junta were obviously determined to push hard for the Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC) to add their proposal to the draft.

To achieve their goal, Prayut and the NCPO would need to overcome two obstructions posed by the CDC and politicians.

First, Prayut needs to convince CDC chief Meechai Ruchupan to add the selected Senate proposal to apply for the first five-year period stipulated in the draft.

Meechai initially rebutted the idea – but last week he seemed to have softened his stance. He said he had waited for an official proposal in a written document so he would be able to decide whether he could or could not follow the NCPO’s demand.

Meechai will have to think carefully. It will be a challenge for the 78-year-old legal expert to decide on a proposal that observers called a “dictator in disguise” in the charter draft.

One CDC adviser, Jade Donavanik, warned that if the CDC followed the demands of the junta it would be more difficult for the draft to pass the referendum. He said the CDC would face difficulties explaining to voters why they must follow the junta’s orders but not the public’s needs.

The CDC is expected to review the political structure section, including the origins of the Senate, and the provisional clause this week.

However, if Meechai refuses to write the clauses as the NCPO demands, the junta could seek help from the National Legislative Assembly and the National Reform Steering Assembly.

The latest amendment to the 2014 interim charter allows the two bodies to propose an additional question for voters to be included with the national referendum for the draft. Both bodies could ask voters to choose “yes” or “no” for a selected Senate.

If the question is asked in the referendum and voters approve the proposal, the CDC would have to review the final draft in accordance with the referendum results, according to the amendment of the 2014 interim charter.

However, a tougher task would be getting both the draft and the new question to pass in the referendum.

Both major political camps – Pheu Thai and the Democrat Party – have expressed their opposition to the draft, and especially a potential clause about a selected Senate. They felt the idea would lessen politicians’ power and subject the government to close scrutiny by a Senate that would not be elected. So, politicians will definitely campaign for their supporters to vote down the draft.

Hence, it’s risky for the junta if it pushes too hard for a selected Senate. Failing to pass the referendum could mean voters reject the NCPO as well.