Activists see this order as bringing cheer to the business sector, but suffering to people.

The junta’s order can be seen as an attempt to boost the economy by investment spending considering the withering exports.

Since Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha took power in 2014, a number of projects that were supposed to have taken off have fallen short of the government’s target. One of the main reasons is the long period required for the EIA process, resulting in construction costs and compensation for land expropriation surging. Some projects took as long as eight years to pass the EIA.

Last year, the government announced its “Action Plan” to invest Bt1.6 trillion in infrastructure projects. Construction was expected to start within 2017.

A part of the Thai-Chinese standard-gauge railway project for the Bangkok-Nong Khai route is contained in the plan. Recently, the Chinese side completed its design work and submitted it to Thailand for consideration. Issues regarding investment in the project is still in the process of negotiations.

Not surprisingly, the super-fast lane will be used for the Thai-China railway project. Negotiations between the two governments had installed since the 10th meeting planned in Beijing last month-end was put off. The new schedule has yet to be set, making the project’s ground-breaking planned for May in doubt.

At market-testing events held over the past few weeks in Khon Kaen and Saraburi – two out of five provinces through which the railroad will pass – many people did not want the railroad to pass through their cities or communities.

The local people proposed to the government to elevate the railroad over their cities or communities, as they did not believe they would benefit from the railroad. They saw only travellers from Bangkok and foreign tourists as the beneficiaries. This could push up the construction cost substantially.

According to the amended law, the projects under supervision of the state and related agencies can ask the Cabinet for the “super-fast lane” if they are urgently required for public benefit such as building of hospitals and residences or those related to transportation, disaster prevention, and irrigation.

The fast-lane approval will allow the agencies to proceed with the process of selecting private companies to participate even while the EIA process is underway. This could help reduce by half the period of time for the consideration process, as one process does not have to wait for the other to conclude.

Under the normal process, projects have to seek approval from the Cabinet first, which is followed by the EIA process. After the projects secure the EIA approval, the process of selecting private firms to participate in projects begins.

However, the junta’s order will not allow the agencies responsible for the projects to engage in any legal transactions with private firms until the projects pass the EIA process. The activists’ view this as an attempt to heap pressure on parties involved in the EIA review process.

At this point, the private firms are also at risk if they decide to participate in the state undertaking [or bidding for the projects’ construction]. If the projects do not get the EIA approval, the selected private companies will not get the jobs and they would have wasted their time.

The question that arises is whether we should have a mechanism to balance the excessive power of the administration and the voice of people when any projects are truly needed?

The junta’s attempt to shorten the process for consideration of infrastructure projects might be well-intentioned to pull the country out of the middle-income trap. But such a shortcut could also harm the “checks and balances” system in the long term. Eventually the economic growth we admire might not be sustainable.

And it is likely that the current Constitution Drafting Commission, chaired by Meechai Ruchupan, may end up meeting the same fate as its predecessor, the Constitution Drafting Committee, which was led by Borwornsak Uwanno.

At that time, nobody expected the draft constitution written by Borwornsak and his team would be rejected by the National Reform Council (NRC). For many observers, Borwornsak’s team seemed to be writing the draft charter in a way that met the demands of the ruling National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). But finally the draft failed to be put to a national referendum.

This time around, the head drafter is Meechai, a veteran law expert behind the drafting of many constitutions in the past. Observers expected him to succeed – by drafting a draft constitution that gets majority support in a national vote.

Like their predecessors led by Borwornsak, Meechai’s team is writing the new constitution in line with requirements set by the post-coup interim charter. However, their draft seems to be insufficient to please certain groups among the people in power.

It was said that Borwornsak’s draft was voted down by the NRC because there was no clause for selected senators appointed by the NCPO, as had been suggested by some members of National Legislative Assembly. It was rumoured the NLA members wanted to make a comeback to Parliament as senators.

A similar suggestion has re-emerged. This time around it comes from government figures, including Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, who called for selected senators during a five-year transitional period after the next general election. Critics have called this “semi-democracy”.

A veteran like Meechai certainly does not want to make it too obvious. He is well aware that by clearly writing a clause on selected senators, his draft constitution has a good chance of being rejected in the referendum. That proposal for selected senators can be easily viewed as an attempt by the junta to stay on in power.

Meechai has insisted on the original draft, which calls for senators to be indirectly elected from among representatives from 20 occupations. Judging from his latest stance, it is unlikely that Meechai will yield to pressure over this matter.

The chief drafter and other CDC members were absent from Monday’s meeting of the core government agencies at Government House, where issues on the draft charter were also discussed. Meechai explained later he did not get an invitation to the meeting. He also said he was concerned he might be given a “binding obligation” in regard to the charter if he had been present at the meeting.

Meechai denied that he was afraid of being given “orders” from people in power in regard to revisions of the draft. He said the NCPO could instruct the drafters but that the CDC would decide whether to follow orders. “We will carefully consider the reasons and details,” he said.

It will be interesting to see what happens to this draft constitution if the drafters remain firm with their original draft, particularly the clauses involving senators.

Will the draft get full support from the people in power for ta referendum? Or will they let the draft fail the vote so that they can write a new constitution that fully satisfies them?

First and foremost: the nature of the new administration in Nay Pyi Taw is totally different from the outgoing one and notably from the current Thai regime. President Thein Sein, who will step down at the end of the month, is a former commander who heads the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). It would be more precise to say that the USDP is the civilian political wing of the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces).

The NLD-led government will be different because it has no strong linkage with the military. The party has fought against military rule since the beginning. With victory in the general election, the party has more confidence and stronger popular support to take more political space from the military.

The party will not give up its mission to amend the constitution, not only to allowSuu Kyi to take the top position in the country, but also to reduce the role of the Tatmadaw in politics and state administration.

The current Thai government was, of course, installed by the National Council for Peace and Order, the military junta which toppled an elected civilian government in May 2014. This regime is somewhat similar to what Myanmar had before the reforms more than half a decade ago. While Myanmar is in transition to full civilian rule, Thailand is on the way back to military rule, if not to the same degree as Myanmar used to be, but similar perhaps to the quasi-democracy that Thailand had in the early 1980s.

Secondly, the Thai military has rarely engaged with the NLD. The top brass here, as in Myanmar, generally believed they could sustain power forever. They believed military-to-military relations would dominate state-to-state ties. They clashed in the past, but also had personal relations. Myanmar’s top commander Senior General Min Aung Hlaing had close connections with many Thai commanders, notably the chairman of the Privy Council, General Prem Tinsulanonda, who now acts like the godfather to the Thai Army.

Meanwhile, many Thai politicians – not only Pheu Thai’s Yingluck Shinawatra, the former premier, but also Democrat leader Abhisit Vejjajiva – never cut their relations with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. When she was in office, Yingluck visited ‘The Lady’. And Suu Kyi made a high profile visit to Thailand when she was in opposition and Yingluck was Thailand’s PM. Yingluck is now playing the role of Thailand’s Suu Kyi in her crusade against the military regime.

Thirdly, Thailand and Myanmar have a lot of issues and problems to deal with jointly. Large sections of the border between the two countries are undefined grey areas, as only a small portion of the boundary line has been properly demarcated. And there’s no need to mention other issues such as narcotics and arms smuggling, as well as human trafficking. The Tatmadaw is still in charge of these matters, of course, but policies from now on will be issued and enforced by the NLD-led government.

And along the border, some armed ethnic groups have yet to reach peace solutions with the government. President Thein Sein managed to bring some of them in, but many others are still outside the ceasefire agreement and continue to engage in armed struggle. Recent Thai governments should be given some credit, though, for helping to facilitate peace talks between the Myanmar government and ethnic groups.

Some questions are still unresolved, as some ethnic groups – not only those in the peace process but many outside it – plus the government in Thailand, are still unaware of NLD policy in regard to these matters.

Do Thai women have their presence felt in the social, economic, cultural and political landscape?

At the Commerce Ministry, permanent secretary Chutima Bunyapraphasara has proudly ranked herself among the many women that have important posts in running the country’s commercial affairs. And the ministry’s six key departments are all led by female officials.

In the private sector, several prominent executives are also female. Chadatip Chutrakul and Supaluck Umpujh together launched the highly successful Siam Paragon. Supaluck, also the vice president of The Mall Group, is now working on the mega EM District project. Nualphan Lamsam has also stood out as a top executive of Muang Thai Insurance Plc.

In various occupations, Thai women have been proving that they can work as well as men.

Yaowalak Anuphan, director of the award-winning Thai Lawyers for Human Rights Centre , said: “Two decades ago, laws firms were reluctant to hire women. They felt women would have so many constraints about travelling to provinces and staying overnight for work. But there’s no such attitude anymore. There’s no sexual discrimination in the legal profession these days.”

As the legal profession became more accepting of women, the number of female lawyers rose significantly, Yaowalak said.

In Thailand’s political landscape, two members of the current Cabinet are female. They are Tourism and Sports Minister Kobkarn Wattanavrangkul and Industry Minister Atchaka Sibunruang.

Not many years ago, Yingluck Shinawatra also made history when she became Thailand’s first female prime minister.

A familiar face for the protection of women and children in the Thai society is also a woman – Paveena Hongsakul. In so many high-profile legal cases, Khunying Porntip Rojanasunan is also a figure many people turn to for help in ensuring the reliability of forensic-test results.

Thai gender parity, overall, appears significantly better than the world average. A global survey by Grant Thornton revealed that Thailand ranks among countries with the highest proportion of leadership roles held by women in the Asia Pacific (APAC) region.

Some 37 per cent of all senior management roles in this country are held by women. The two other states that ranked well were the Philippines (39 per cent) and Indonesia (36 per cent).

Globally, the proportion of senior business roles held by women stands at 24 per cent, up slightly from 22 per cent last year.

Still, Thailand should be able to do better. Russia, which has the highest number of women specifically in executive roles (45 per cent), show there is still room for improvement.

Gender parity aside, I reckon that Thailand should try harder to advance women’s rights and protection.

Yaowalak, who has worked on many sexual abuse and domestic violence cases, laments that the situation regarding such cases has hardly changed, as many victims keep silent.

According to the Public Health Ministry, it is estimated one in five women are subject to rape or attempted rape at least once in their lives.

While laws prescribe protection for women, there is probably not enough awareness of when people – men and women alike – should stand up to prevent an offence.

In the United States, a big campaign is now underway with four main objectives: To recognise that non-consensual sex is sexual assault; to identify situations in which sexual assault may occur; to intervene in situations where consent has not or cannot be given; and to create an environment in which sexual assault is unacceptable and survivors are supported.

Soon after US Vice President Joe Biden went on stage at the Academy Awards and implored Oscar viewers to “take the pledge”, the campaign’s “It’s On Us” website went down due to a surge in traffic, which showed the huge attention from people keen to act on such a campaign.

So, let’s hope that similar efforts are made in Thailand too. Let’s support not just gender quality but also try to stop sexual violence in all circumstances.

Women deserve equality – equal opportunities, protection and support.

Sasin walked over 300 kilometres from the park. He was cheered by passers-by and those who shared the same ideology until he reached the centre of Bangkok.

That rally campaign a few years ago drew a huge amount of support especially from Bangkokians, who at first hardly knew anything about the dam. The campaign was acclaimed for being hugely successful in the conservation field as it managed to bring an issue far from public awareness to people’s hearts.

As a journalist who covered this issue, I know that Sasin and his team at the Seub Nakhasathien Foundation, where for a time he was secretary, never stopped working during the campaign.

Sasin and his team had seriously explored alternative water management ideas to tackle the same challenge of drought and flooding in the area that the Royal Irrigation Department kept referring to in a push for the dam’s construction.

And they actually came up with one, preparing a thick report presented to the public to support their proposal.

To see what the alternative option was, I once travelled more than 100 kilometres from the planned dam construction site to the villages that either stood to lose or gain benefits from the dam. It was during this time that I saw that option emerge.

Existing small reservoirs behind the villages were connected to networks of natural canals that if improved, would be no less effective than the dam and its irrigation infrastructure in helping restore, distribute and even divert water if efforts were made to properly manage and maintain them.

The villagers just needed support, and several were ready to take action and join the chorus to say “No dam”.

What I also saw was the strength of local power and their readiness to stand up and say something about an issue of importance to their lives, and if necessary, take action.

Perhaps like Sasin, I don’t know whether to define this as a public participation exercise, a decentralisation of power endeavour, or direct democracy in action, and I think we have hardly had a thought about that when dealing with the issue.

In fact, almost all environmental issues are about struggles in resource sharing, which politics plays a significant role in, and there is no need to differentiate the issues as they are one and the same.

So, I was very surprised to read several posts attacking Sasin for not coming out at a time when the military is ruling the country. Some have suggested he may fear the military, which I view as hilarious.

For environmental issues in this country, those fighting them face a difficult enough time. So, it’s such a waste of time and energy to politicise the issues while undermining efforts made by conservationists. They deserve more morale support from us as they have been fighting in the political battleground.

The Mea Wong dam has been pushed back and forth between the department and the conservationists for nearly 30 years. It’s a hard battle to win even when the latter has evidence supporting an alternative option to the dam.

Instead of being critical and undertaking action carelessly in the name of pro-democracy, we should look into the issue seriously and offer creative options.

For me, I fully support Sasin and other conservationists, and I know that they have been fighting really hard – no matter whether it is in the name of democracy or not.

 

They are weighing the pros and cons as well as different provisions in the new charter draft.

Before we decide whether to vote for or against the draft, we should first look at how this charter was conceived. It still holds true that people write laws to serve their class interests.

The need to draft a new constitution came after the previous one was abolished in the military coup of May 22, 2014. The coup-makers, National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), seemed to believe that the previous government should be blamed for the country’s problems. Also, their goal was to complete an “unfinished mission” by those behind the coup of September 2006.

For the people in power, the problems lie with politicians close to former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the legal system that facilitated the growth of Thaksin’s proxy Pheu Thai Party.

Politicians loyal to Thaksin and his proxy party have won general elections repeatedly, and they seem to remain popular for a long time to come.

The constitution of 1997, which is favoured by Thaksin and Pheu Thai, created the political system that we see today. Although that charter was abolished in the 2006 coup and the new charter of 2007 was applied, the ideology and political structure inherited from the 1997 constitution have remained unchanged. So, the previous charter was still influenced by the one from 1997. That means the coup-makers of 2006 failed to complete their mission.

The generals who staged the coup in 2014 have promised not to “waste it”. That could imply that they want to set new rules so that the country will never go back to the point seen before the coup.

A main goal is to neutralise the polarised politics by restricting the movement of politicians that the junta views as problematic. They have done a good job in this regard. But by using force, the result will be just temporary. In order to ensure a permanent effect, a new political structure must be created, which means writing a new constitution in a way they like.

The new political structure may be unsatisfactory to many, but the people in power do not seem to care. It appears they believe that what they do will help get rid of what they do not desire.

Judging from their goal, it is unlikely that the constitution drafters will make any serious revisions to the draft charter, particularly regarding the electoral system. A single ballot will be used for both constituency and party-list elections. As a result, no political parties will be able to win a majority in the House of Representatives, which makes a coalition government inevitable.

The post-election government will experience tough scrutiny measures by the new rules and powerful independent organisations designed to closely examine the administrative branch.

Also, the people in power have suggested a five-year transitional period, in which certain constitutional rules are not fully enforced. This is viewed as an attempt to maintain power when the country returns to an election mode.

With this information in hand, you – the voter – can make a decision easily in the referendum. If you want an altered political system that reflects the NCPO motives, you should vote for the draft constitution. If you want democracy, there is only one choice for you.

The plot thickened when Prayut Chan-o-cha’s Cabinet submitted 16 proposals on the charter draft to the Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC) on February 18.

The 16th item proposed that drafters include a provisional clause that allowed a special mechanism to maintain peace and order after the general election and during the handover to a new government.

Establishing what is called a “quasi-democracy” during the transitional period, the proposal was seen as an attempt by the junta’s National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) to retain power over a new government.

One day later, that attempt was confirmed by former charter chief writer Borwornsak Uwanno, whose charter draft was rejected by the now-defunct National Reform Council last September.

“I felt sad for just one day. The next day I realised it [the NCPO] wanted to stay [in power] longer,” Borwornsak told reporters at a charter seminar when asked how he felt after his draft was voted down.

Borwornsak also revealed that the Cabinet had earlier submitted a similar proposal for the transitional period to the charter drafting committee that he had led.

While he refused to elaborate further, his rejected draft included a National Strategic Reform and Reconciliation Committee, or a “crisis” panel. The panel – which is believed to have been the main reason the draft was rejected – was intended to break a political impasse, but it also gave rise to fears that it could overrule the next government in power.

Three days later, a source close to the NCPO revealed a proposal by members of the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) and the National Reform Steering Assembly to have 200 appointed Senators, which would be authorised in conjunction with the lower House to pick the next PM.

The idea, which academics have called “insane”, would ensure the Senate’s full support for the junta after an election.

The next day, it was Prayut who affirmed the country needed a special mechanism to advance reforms during a five-year transitional period.

“It [the mechanism] could be a new panel or the Senate or whoever to control the direction,” he said, adding that the mechanism would help guide the next government.

Those moves then led to two ex-premiers launching strong attacks against the charter draft and the junta.

First, Thaksin Shinawatra accused the junta of jeopardising the nation’s fragile economy by pushing for a new constitution that, he said, was designed to perpetuate the military’s power in politics.

Later, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh called on the NCPO to relinquish power and hold a general election this year.

The pair echoed the same thoughts – trying to pre-empt the junta from staying in power longer than the road map specified, and campaigning for people to vote against the charter.

However, the ability of the junta to retain power now depends on CDC chief Meechai Ruchupan and his panel, and their decision whether or not to add any special rules to fulfil the junta’s intentions.

According to the 2014 interim charter, when the draft is complete the CDC should inform the Cabinet, which in turn will inform the Election Commission forthwith to organise a nation referendum as scheduled.

This means the Cabinet will not be authorised to make changes to the draft, nor have the power to approve or reject it after Meechai submits it by the March 29 deadline.

After a serious recent meeting between Meechai and Deputy Prime Minister Wissanu Krea-ngam – who is also the government’s legal expert – the chief drafter showed no signs of agreeing to a special body or mechanism that would take effect during the transitional period.

Meechai affirmed that the new constitution would have mechanisms that made it necessary for elected governments to implement reforms – but not a special body that could overrule a government.

“When an election takes place and the country has a government, the NCPO has to go,” Meechai said last Thursday.

On the surface, it looked as if the issue would become a conflict between Meechai and the government. But it was the prime minister who picked Meechai for the crucial task of drafting the constitution, so observers doubted whether the latter would really refuse to satisfy the |former’s wish.

Prayut and the junta may have good intentions to see the country move forward smoothly during a transitional period – but if the drafters really add a special mechanism in line with the junta’s request, both the CDC and the government would need to justify the reason to the public and the international community.

In a modern world, where people are more enthusiastic and informed about politics, it would seem difficult for the junta to retain its power for long after an election.

It would be too easy to say that a strike by pilots was the main reason for the cancellation of flights. Surprisingly, it was revealed that there were only two pilots stopping work on that day.

Was it a lack of pilots or perhaps a lack of crisis management that might better explain the situation?

Work stoppage by only two pilots could not have resulted in nine flights being cancelled.

Nok Air chief executive officer Patee Sarasin said recently there was a shortage of pilots. He explained that many were working hours in excess of the standard limits on flying.

Nok Air’s abandonment of more than 1,000 passengers at Don Mueang Airport for 10 hours with no senior officials to take care of them can only be explained as a lack of crisis management.

All fingers now seem to be pointing at fierce competition in the industry, caused by the rising number of low-cost airlines.

Learning a lesson from the Nok Air fiasco, the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand (CAAT) recently ordered all 14 domestic airlines to submit contingency plans on managing crises in aviation operations, aviation safety, and computer and IT.

Transport Minister Arkhom Termpittayapaisith earlier suggested that the CAAT, as aviation regulator, should consider the number of pilots when permitting airlines to increase their number of flights.

But that is not enough. In fact, the CAAT should constantly update its auditing of airlines’ status. How would it become known if the number of pilots shown during the audit process changed the day after permission was granted for more flights?

Nok Air’s flight cancellations also expose the gaping holes in how authorities are regulating air operators. Nok Air might be the weakest link among peers. In spite of low fuel prices, Nok Air posted a loss of more than Bt1 billion in 2015 while Bangkok Airways and Thai AirAsia each recored a net profit in excess of Bt1 billion in the same period.

“Fierce competition” could be the catalyst to push Nok Air to hit the jackpot in terms of pilot shortage. Meanwhile, the red flag for the country’s aviation safety audit standards in June last year by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) should be a wake-up call also for the Thai aviation regulator. This means airlines registered and certified by Thai aviation-related authorities will not be allowed to expand their destinations or frequency of flights and will be banned from flying to other countries if their aviation regulators follow the result of ICAO’s assessment.

The US Federation Aviation Administration also downgraded the country’s aviation safety standard to category II status following the ICAO’s concerns in December last year while the European Aviation Safety Agency is in the process of examining the country, which it hopes to pass.

Because of the ICAO’s red flag, the CAAT was set up, replacing the Department of Civil Aviation, to be responsible for regulating air operators for aviation operation and aviation safety standards as part of the country’s overhaul of aviation regulations to meet international standards after years of neglect.

For the red flag to be removed, the CAAT would need to recruit more than 500 experts in the next three years, a half of them expected to be transferred from existing relevant agencies, in a bid to expedite the air operation certificate recertification for 41 airlines. One of the important issues that the ICAO will consider is about rules on flight time and flight duty period limitations.

The CAAT’s recertification time frame was delayed several times since the end of last year due to disruptions from being examined by international aviation agencies. In the meantime, the authority needs to help Nok Air restore passenger confidence before it harms the industry. Recently, Nok Air announced it would cancel more flights and would fly charter aircraft until the end of this month, after 20 flights were cancelled on Monday.

So, this could be the light at the end of the tunnel to complete the recertification for all 41 airlines by the end of this year, implying that Thailand will have to bear the red flag at least until next year.

His rare interviews to the media certainly have dominated the news space. Clearly,Thaksin is still viewed as a main party in the country’s ongoing political conflict. And it was the first time since the coup in 2014 that he had called publicly for talks with the opposite side.

Thaksin’s offer has been rejected by the people in power.

We cannot be completely sure what Thaksin wanted from this offer for talks. And we cannot be certain whether he genuinely wants to end the decade-long political conflict.

If he is really serious about this – what is the purpose of his proposed talks? Is he going to call for the new constitution to be written in a “more democratic” way? Is he going to push for an end to the long drawn-out conflict or find a way out for the country? Is he going to find a solution for himself or for his family members – including sister and former prime minister Yingluck – who are facing different criminal and civil cases?

Thaksin has to make it clear publicly what is the real purpose of his “talks request” with the junta.

The next question involves Thaksin’s status. Normally both sides in talks must have equal bargaining power and possess something the other side wants.

Even when he commanded political power and a strong following from his supporters, Thaksin failed to gain the upper hand over the other side in their negotiations. Today, his bargaining power is even weaker. Although he has a number of supporters, their movements have been restricted.

Thaksin may be confident that his proxy Pheu Thai Party will win the next general election. However, even if the party wins the poll, they will see their power limited by provisions under the new constitution. They will also find it very difficult to amend the charter.

If he sees himself as leader of a party to the conflict, who does he expect to sit on the other side of the negotiating table? Is it General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the prime minister and head of the National Council for Peace and Order? Does he expect to negotiate with the NCPO as a group – or some people behind them?

Thaksin also has to be reminded of his claim that he was “double-crossed” after the previous talks, as the other side failed to follow their agreements.

Judging from the facts involved, it seems Thaksin’s latest call for talks is aimed simply at gaining attention from the media and the public. The timing appears to be right for him: the draft constitution has come under heavy criticism and the country’s economy is still on a downward trend.

However, Thaksin may have forgotten that he is no longer a leader of the movement. He has disappointed his followers many times already, pushing for a blanket amnesty law from which he would also benefit – and making no response at all when an elected government led by Pheu Thai was overthrown in the latest coup.

Once, he may have regarded himself as the centre of the world. But today people have moved on, away from him, and are ready to push for democracy by themselves. They do not need a helping hand that is tainted with conflict of interest. They no longer need to rally for the personal benefit of any politician that they admire.

Both Thaksin and the people in power should be aware of this fact.

The diplomatic ties between Thailand and Russia are at a pivotal stage. The military government under Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha has tilted its foreign policy closer to Moscow since relations cooled with the United States and the West after the military coup of May 2014.

Leaders in Moscow have been seeking a wider role in Southeast Asia amid the rising influence of China and the US pivot to Asia. Thailand, as a result, has been looking forward to optional military deals due to its current uncomfortable engagement with Washington. Prayut‘s government also needs market diversification for Thai goods, notably low-priced farm products, and hopes Russia could replace the low demand from the West and China.

Although it was initiated by the junta’s number one enemy – Thaksin Shinawatra, the premier toppled in the 2006 coup – the two-in-one idea to barter commodities such as rice and rubber with military equipment has attracted the Prayutgovernment’s interest for quite some time.

Indeed, relations between Thailand and Russia in recent times have been remarked on since the first-ever visit of Russian head of state, President Vladimir Putin in October 2003 when Thailand hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) Summit in Bangkok during Thaksin’s government. Since then, a number of high-profile visits were made, notably by Her Majesty the Queen on the occasion of the 110th anniversary of bilateral relations in July 2007. Visits by the Royal Family to Russia have been made frequently since then. HRH Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn visited Russia in 2008 and HRH Princess Chulabhorn in 2011 and 2012.

The engagement with Russia has been highlighted intensively during the Prayutgovernment. The junta-run Thailand badly needs international recognition and friends in the wake of pressure from the West following the military’s intervention in the domestic political conflict.

Prime Minister Prayut seeks comfort meetings with foreign leaders every time he travels abroad for international meetings, and Russian leaders are always available. Prayut has already met his Russia counterpart Dmitry Medvedev three times in over a year. They met for the first time in Nay Pyi Taw during an AseanSummit in November 2014. Medvedev made an official visit to Thailand, the first ever in 25 years by a Russian premier, in April last year. The visit was dubbed a great success as both sides signed a number of pacts for cooperation on energy, investment, drug and crime suppression, tourism and culture.

The two premiers met again last November during an Apec Summit in the Philippines. Deputy PM Prawit’s visit also will prepare for another meeting betweenPrayut and Medvedev in Moscow when Prayut attends the Russia-Asean summit there in May this year.

Despite taking economic tsar Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak with him, Prawit – who is in charge of security matters and is the defence minister – reportedly paid much attention to buying new battle tanks and transportation helicopters from Russia.

Prawit denied reports of a deal on the Russian T90 tank. But he has not dismissed its possibility, as a deal with Ukraine on the main battle tanks is in difficulty with only 10 out of 50 having been delivered so far.

A Thai delegation recently visited the Russian city of Nizhny Tagil, site of the largest main battle tank manufacturer in the world.

In September, it was reported that Russia’s Rostec conglomerate was looking to sell military hardware to Thailand in exchange for commodities such as rubber and rice. The company’s subsidiaries were executing a |contract to supply Thailand with Mi-17 transport helicopters, as well as Superjet 100 aircraft, the Defence Industry Daily reported.

However the deal on military equipment might not be tangible in a short time since the government, despite its wish list, is short of budget due to the economic slowdown and its poor economic management skills.

The Thai military budget has increased consecutively since the previous coup in 2006. It stood at Bt207 billion in fiscal 2016, but Prayut and Prawit have no freedom to cut into this situation. Furthermore, there are many other aspects in their relations with Russia such as economic, culture and crime suppression, which are worth developing.