The “People GO Network” Facebook page – where the entire walk is broadcast live – said a crowd-control unit of 100 to 200 officers arrived at 5am at Wat Lat Sai in Ayutthaya, where the marchers had spent the night, and loudly called for the group’s leader to come forward.

The group resumed the walk at 6am, but then encountered a police checkpoint.

It was reported on Facebook that all cars were searched, licence plates and ID cards photographed and people interviewed.

A truck carrying food and beverages for the marchers was taken to a police station and its four occupants interviewed without lawyers present. They were released almost four hours later without being charged, the group said.

Police were reportedly citing the government ban on assemblies of five or more people. The network decided to split the marchers into groups of four so the walk could continue.

The People GO Network is an umbrella group of civil organisations working on issues related to rights and politics.

The marching, aimed at raising issues on healthcare, food security, human and community rights and the Constitution, began on Saturday at Thammsat University Rangsit on the outskirts of Bangkok, with scores of activists joining.

The goal is to cover 800,000 steps or 450 kilometres, reaching Khon Kaen on February 17.

Coordinator Supaporn Malailoy told The Nation that Khon Kaen was chosen to reflect their demand for government decentralisation and because the route follows Mittraphap Road, whose name can be translated as “friendship”.

As the activists walk, they seek out friends along the route to share their ideas about civic issues and the government’s failure to address them, she said.

Is there such a thing as delaying the imposition of a law? How?

Yes. There is such a practice. When the law is promulgated in the Royal Gazette, it does not necessarily mean that it goes into effect. A stipulation will dictate whether it should be enforced immediately, the following day, or after 30, 90 or 180 days – or even a year later. Usually, the delay is meant to enable affected agencies or individuals to make arrangements for changes brought by the law.

But for the organic laws that the military-backed government has proclaimed are essential for holding the post-coup election, a significant time gap has not been the norm. At least over the past two decades, these kinds of laws came into effect the day after promulgation in the Royal Gazette.

Charters have even laid out the exact timing to complete organic bills and for the subsequent elections. This is precisely intended to ensure that the process is not stalled and that an election can take place as soon as possible to return power to the people.

Does the delay of the enforcement of the law also mean a poll delay?

An optimist would note that the MPs election bill has not yet been finalised. The National Legislative Assembly (NLA) must still debate and decide on it. But yes, if the assembly agrees, then the so-called “road map to democracy” will be extended for yet another three months.

And on another optimistic note, some legislators have said it was still possible to avoid a delay in the election. The Constitution stipulates that the vote has to be conducted within 150 days after all four essential laws are in effect. So if the poll could take place on day 60 or sooner, then there would be no delay.

Yet sceptics doubt that would be the case.

Why does the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) need the interval?

Some people may believe that authoritarian rulers have a tendency to cling to power and will do everything they can to prolong the legislative process and postpone the election. But this is not so much the case this time, given the mounting pressure on the NCPO after almost four years of rule and repeated delays in the election timing.

Adding the 90-day extension is about ensuring the election does not take place before November, the month that Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha chose in a pledge to the Thai public and leaders of the free world, according to a source close to the junta.

That timetable was based on the assumption that all the legal and pre-vote legislative processes would use up the maximum time given. If any one of the steps were completed “prematurely”, the election would be brought forward with the vote held before November.

And November, or the last quarter of the year, was chosen strategically. It is when the government deals with the annual budget as well as the appointment and reshuffling of public servants.

If the junta government still has full power during the period, it can make sure it can appoint the “right people” to the “right positions”. This could be vital for their political ambitions after the poll.

And the extra 90 days could also come in handy for the junta to build a military-linked party as its backup plan to contest the next election.

Was the move well planned out?

The NLA legislators – despite having been handpicked by the junta – have insisted that they were independent and free of the junta influence on the matter. But sceptics view the latest delaying action as having been planned when the junta issued the order that overturned the political parties organic bill. This kept in place its ban on current parties participating in political activities.

The controversial order also dictates that after the MPs election law is promulgated, the NCPO may consider lifting the ban and itself join with political movements to prepare its activities leading to the election.

The 90-day gap could be used to implement those steps.

What else could “the miracle of the law” do?

The NLA could conveniently turn down the organic bill if it found any controversial issues that were found disagreeable by the Constitution Drafting Commission or other related agencies. The bill would need to be redrafted and the Constitution does not say how long it should take.

The junta has already demonstrated that it might not be held to its commitments for the return to democracy.

The road map was prolonged in 2015 when the first draft of the charter was aborted, resulting in a whole new round of constitution writing, which took more than one year to complete, including the referendum process.

So if the MPs election bill is shot down, the election would be postponed indefinitely.

PRESSURE is building on the junta government and Deputy Prime Minister General Prawit Wongsuwan, although the defence minister had until recently seemed secure in office despite the ongoing scandal over photographs of him wearing opulent wristwatches.

A former military officer, however, is backing Prawit’s account of the origins of the watches that many people took as a poor joke – that the watches previously belonged to a friend who had subsequently died.

Former deputy prime minister MR Pridiyathorn Devakula said yesterday that if he faced similar circumstances, he would have already resigned. “If we do something wrong, we have to show spirit,” he said.

He also referred to General Prem Tinsulanonda’s regime, when the country was also not under democratic rule. As the prime minister at the time, Prem took swift action against misbehaving ministers to set a good example, he said.

Pridiyathorn added that he believed Prawit would resign soon because of the mounting pressure.

However, any outcome would also depend on Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, he said.

A former military officer speaking on condition of anonymity named Pattawat Suksriwong as Prawit’s friend who had lent him the watches. Some of the luxury watches Prawit was seen wearing previously belonged to the late businessman, who passed away last year, the source said.

“Pattawat collected luxury watches. He had a collection of hundreds of them,” the source said. “He lent them to his close friends and Prawit is one of those friends. Their friends who went to the St Gabriel School know this.”

The source said that Pridi-yathorn, also a St Gabriel alumnus, was also aware of the story.

However, the source said he did not know when the timepieces were lent to Prawit. It would not be illegal but still it was important that Prawit explained the issue to the public, the retired general said.

However, Pridiyathorn yesterday denied any knowledge of the loans or the watch collections of Pattawat.

“You have to ask his children. I don’t have that deep [level] of information,” he said.

Pridiyathorn also laughed in response to a question of whether he had also been lent a watch and said that he would never take the offer, adding that he would also be in trouble if he had.

Prawit is facing fierce criticism after being photographed wearing many high-end timepieces on different occasions.

The public is continuing to question how a military officer making less than Bt1 million a year could possibly have afforded the luxury items.

The government’s inaction and Prawit’s account that the watches had been lent to him by a late friend continued to draw questions and scepticism, including from the international media.

Among the existing senior politicians, she has been viewed as the strongest competitor to incumbent Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, who according to many political observers is a leading candidate to become the next government head – although he is prohibited by law to contest the election.

Some expect Prayut to become a non-elected prime minister after the election, with support from the 250 junta-appointed senators and smaller political parties that are pro-junta. The 2016 Constitution allows a non-elected prime minister in the first five years after its promulgation.

For many political observers, Prayut’s recent moves have indicated his political ambition. These included his admission that he is a politician and his unusually frequent visits to different rural areas.

Sudarat, meanwhile, has won the blessing of Pheu Thai’s “big boss”, fugitive ex-PM Thaksin Shinawatra, for her to lead the party into the election.

In her latest move, Sudarat appealed for other political parties to join Pheu Thai in its opposition to an “outsider” prime minister, which she said would undermine the political system. Sudarat said Prayut had a good chance to become that “outsider” prime minister thanks to support from the 250 junta-appointed senators and the many political heavyweights Prayut has met recently.

This was the first time that Sudarat has clearly campaigned against Prayut.

It came shortly after a group of Pheu Thai politicians from the Northeast declared their “lifelong loyalty” to the party – a development that came amid speculation that new, pro-Prayut political parties are wooing election candidates from established parties such as Pheu Thai.

Pheu Thai will need a landslide victory in the next election, tentatively scheduled for November, or a House of Representatives majority if it wants to prevent an outsider PM.

After the election, only two camps seem likely to contest to form the next government – Pheu Thai and the pro-Prayut alliance. While Pheu Thai has no clear allies, the other camp seems to have gained support from many political groups.

That was why Pheu Thai tried to find allies by asking other political parties to back its campaign against an “outsider” becoming prime minister. Pheu Thai’s selling point is to declare itself as a champion of democracy that is opposing a non-democratic way of selecting the government head.

The other major political party, Democrat, has only a small chance of contesting for premiership, as it is unlikely to win the most House seats. The Democrats have often stood opposite Pheu Thai and the possibility of the two parties joining forces after the election has been ruled out by many senior Democrats.

It is more likely that the Democrats would join the pro-Prayut camp, as they have never made it clear the party is against an outsider prime minister.

Some political observers say if it fails to win a commanding House majority, Pheu Thai may try to woo the Democrats to form a two-party coalition government by offering their long-time rivals the prime minister’s seat.

However, after the next election, the contest for the PM’s seat will be more likely between Prayut and Sudarat.

Pol Colonel Olarn Sukkasem, a superintendent of the Technology Crime Suppression Division, said that the police are now gathering evidence to file a charge against Charnvit for allegedly breaking the Computer Crime Act’s Article 14.

The law hands out imprisonment of up to five-years or a Bt100,000 fine against anyone convicted of disseminating “dishonest or fraudulent” information into a computer system in ways likely to cause damage to people.

On January 11 and January 15, Charnvit shared two online articles via his Facebook account, commenting on a purse that Naraporn Chan-o-cha carried when she accompanied her husband, Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, on a trip to the White House last October.

Post corrected

The first post he shared suggested that the purse might be a million-baht luxury purse, in addition to other comments about it.

The other post he shared, however, was an article in which he corrected his earlier post, noting that Naraporn’s purse was actually made of a domestic fabric and cost only about Bt1,000.

Both of Charnvit’s posts triggered online criticism of both Naraporn and the Prayut-ruled government.

Charnvit then said that while he is not a luxury-goods expert, he stood by his comments that it is very common practice for elites to own luxury items.

“This case reflects the ‘Thainess’ of Thai elites,” he said. “I stand by my honesty in making comments and am willing to fight in a [legal] procedure.”

Although being a frequent commentator on the roles of Thai elites, the 76-year-old historian and professor usually writes short posts on his Facebook status, nothing likely to prompt a prosecution against him – until this case.

The Thai economy will take a hit if international confidence in the country’s return to democracy is negatively affected by any delay in holding the general election slated for November, several former lawmakers have warned.

Nikorn Chamnong, a former member of Parliament and a member of the National Reform Steering Assembly, said the likely 90-day postponement of elections also ran counter to the intent of the current charter’s Articles 267 and 268.

He said the charter already allowed a total of 150 days for authorities to prepare for the elections so there should not be any further delay.

In addition, he said, supporters of the current charter who had exercised their right in the August 7, 2016 referendum would also be hurt, as they were expecting the general election to be held as announced.

Nikorn warned that a delay would lead to more public criticism of the National Council for Peace and Order (NPCO), since it would be seen as attempting to hold on to power.

He said a delay in the election would tarnish the image of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and he urged members of the National Legislative Assembly to oppose any attempts to postpone it.

Somchai Srisuthiyakorn, a member of the Election Commission (EC), also warned that the likely delay did not bode well for the country’s future, even though it would be acceptable if there were good reasons for the postponement.

He said political parties should have expressed their lack of preparedness for the polls in order to justify the 90-day delay. If more time was needed to prepare for the election, it would be the EC’s duty to clarify the situation, he said, noting that if the NCPO were not ready for the polls they should go public to explain the decision.

Overall, he said, a further delay would not be good for the country’s image because the Thai public and foreigners had been told all along the general election would take place around November this year.

Ong-art Karmpaibul, a deputy leader of the Democrat Party, said the likely delay in holding the election by another 90 days is not surprising as there have been reports that a new political party was being set up for the powers-that-be to return to power.

According to Ong-art, the strategy is to use the new party to attract former MPs from existing major and other smaller political parties and it will support the NCPO head’s return to power.

As a result, more time is needed to make such an arrangement to achieve the goal.

In addition, he said, the NCPO had not lifted a ban on political parties’ activities even though the political party law has been effective for several months.

The NCPO chief also has exercised his power under Article 44 to impose tougher conditions on members of political parties in order to shake up the voters’ base of major parties, he said, cautioning that the latest move could lead to a lack of legitimacy for the new government following the general election.

They have also sought Interpol’s help in issuing a notice requesting cooperation or alerts about Yingluck from police in foreign countries.

Thai police expect that a world-wide “red notice” – asking police to pinpoint the location of a wanted person and arrest them – could be issued by the international policing body in order to bring the fugitive former premier back from her current refuge in London.

That city is now confirmed as her location following publication of recent photos on social media.

However, the red notice has not yet been made, with Interpol headquarters in Lyon, France saying they have not yet received sufficient evidence to issue it. Yet, Thai police have apparently not yet given up.

Why?

As the details of Yingluck’s case are closely examined, the two issues are found to be entwined.

An Interpol red notice has become an essential part of extradition request procedures. This is because it helps locate a wanted person, a critical component required for filling out an extradition request form.

Once the red notice is made, it would be sent to police in 192 countries that have joined the Interpol network.

When the target is located and arrested, Interpol would notify its Thai branch. The Thai police would then inform prosecutors and have them proceed with an extradition request.

Thailand and the United Kingdom have an extradition treaty. Thai prosecutors could coordinate with the British Home Office, or pass the request through the Thai Foreign Ministry.

The Home Office would then forward the matter to British prosecutors, who would forward the extradition request for a British court’s considerations.

Yingluck, meanwhile, could also file an objection to the request with the British trial and appeal courts.

The British government would, however, make the final decision whether to extradite Yingluck to Thai authorities.

While an Interpol red notice would help trigger a person’s arrest, the resulting detention would only be temporary, for perhaps seven to 10 days.

This is clearly different from a normal arrest warrant, where a wanted person may be detained for the duration of the process.

If the extradition request has not been approved by the expiry of the period of detention, the person must be released.

In some previous cases, a person caught through the Interpol red notice process has been dealt with under the foreign country’s immigration law. In that event, Thai police could fetch a person detained at an immigration checkpoint back to Thailand without having to go through the country’s court procedure. This, however, would probably not happen with Yingluck, who holds significance as a former leader of Thailand.

Ultimately, whether Yingluck could be forced to return to Thailand would depend on Interpol, judicial mechanisms in the UK and the junta government’s determination to bring her back for prosecution.

After fleeing Thailand, Yingluck remained unseen until the New Year, when photos of her in London were circulated through social media.

Yingluck was accused of dereliction and malfeasance of duty related to her government’s rice-pledging scheme, which allegedly caused massive financial damage to the state worth Bt500 billion.

She was sentenced in absentia to five years in jail without suspension by the court in a September ruling that had been rescheduled after her flight from the country. Speculation that she is seeking asylum in the UK continues in parallel to attempts by the state to get her back.

Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha recently said that the extradition process was “generally uneasy”.

Public prosecutors, meanwhile, said they have yet to request Yingluck’s extradition from any country.

Amnart Chotchai, director-general of the International Affairs Department of the Attorney-General’s Office, said in early January that the agency needed to gather sufficient and correct information before submitting a request.

“We have to make sure our information is clear and legal, or the requested country may turn us down because we don’t meet their conditions,” Amnart said.

In an exclusive interview with The Nation, Prinya discussed the implications of order 53/2560, which on the surface reschedules the administrative work that parties must undertake prior to the next election – but in reality has massive implications for the party system and democracy in Thailand.

Regardless of the words contained in the order, the real effect of the dictat is to put additional burdens on the older parties while creating an advantage for new parties, said Prinya.

The larger the number of members that a party has, the greater the burden they face in meeting the new requirements, he said. And if they were unable to re-register their members before the deadline, the party could find itself being reset. “The order says new parties will not be at a disadvantage, but in fact they will be at an advantage,” said Prinya.

Junta chief General Prayut Chan-o-cha in mid-December issued an Article 44 order aimed at extending some deadlines for political party administrative work that were outlined in the Political Party Act that came into effect in early October.

The Act was not implemented, and parties claimed that this was because the junta had not lifted its ban on political activities. Political parties now have raised concerns over the short period of time given to them to follow stipulations in the order, and fear that they could lose many of their current members.

The order gives current party members only one month to decide whether they will stay with that party or review their political allegiances. Those wishing to maintain their party memberships must personally take action to submit letters confirming that choice to party leaders and pay their membership fees between April 1 and April 30, or they will lose their member status. Political party leaders have said it would be too difficult to organise for all their members to submit their letters in time.

The junta order also gives existing parties just 30 days from May 1-30, instead of the original 90 days as stated in the current law, to update their lists of members with the registrar of political parties.

Two major parties, the Democrat and Pheu Thai parties, recently filed petitions asking the court to rule whether the order violated the charter. Prinya said it’s now up to the court to decide whether it will choose to take up the petitions and rule on it. He believes that it should do so. A ruling should clarify what is an acceptable exercise of power under Article 44, which was meant to become obsolete when the interim charter was replaced but instead survived when it was added to the new charter.

Prinya said that without the new charter, the use of Article 44 could not be challenged because it was absolute and legitimate. But with the interim charter, which gave birth to Article 44, now dismissed, the court should take up the case and rule to set a standard on the issue. However, Prinya ventured that it was unlikely that Article 44 would be seen as violating the charter on the basis that the power had not been accommodated under Article 265 of the new charter.

Prinya’s view is the order had a negative impact on political party administrative work. It was probably not possible for all party members to verify and confirm their status and for the party to complete all required detailed paperwork as required by the order.

The court, he said, would most likely consider imposing remedies so that the practical realities are brought into alignment with the Constitution.

At the very least, he said the court would carefully consider the petitions and rule on certain clauses that they deem as contradicting the charter.

Junta chief Prayut, meanwhile, has not ruled out the possibility of him entering or engaging in politics in the future. In fact, he has said that he is now a politician and a former military man. If he decided to enter politics, recent developments such as the order could be seen as paving the way to that point, said Prinya.

He said such a move would have a negative impact on the country’s future politics, further deepening conflict and division.

The resulting conflict would put the junta right in the middle of the game, instead of acting as a referee forging reconciliation as was its first vow upon seizing power in 2014.

Prinya had a warning for the junta: do not instigate conflict. “The junta government is at a point of low credibility, so don’t push things that put pressure on yourself,” is his message to the junta.

Pol Colonel Olarn Sukkasem, a superintendent of the Technology Crime Suppression Division, said that the police are now gathering evidence to file a charge against Charnvit for allegedly breaking the Computer Crime Act’s Article 14.

The law hands out imprisonment of up to five-years or a Bt100,000 fine against anyone convicted of disseminating “dishonest or fraudulent” information into a computer system in ways likely to cause damage to people.

On January 11 and January 15, Charnvit shared two online articles via his Facebook account, commenting on a purse that Naraporn Chan-o-cha carried when she accompanied her husband, Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, on a trip to the White House last October.

Post corrected

The first post he shared suggested that the purse might be a million-baht luxury purse, in addition to other comments about it.

The other post he shared, however, was an article in which he corrected his earlier post, noting that Naraporn’s purse was actually made of a domestic fabric and cost only about Bt1,000.

Both of Charnvit’s posts triggered online criticism of both Naraporn and the Prayut-ruled government.

Charnvit then said that while he is not a luxury-goods expert, he stood by his comments that it is very common practice for elites to own luxury items.

“This case reflects the ‘Thainess’ of Thai elites,” he said. “I stand by my honesty in making comments and am willing to fight in a [legal] procedure.”

Although being a frequent commentator on the roles of Thai elites, the 76-year-old historian and professor usually writes short posts on his Facebook status, nothing likely to prompt a prosecution against him – until this case.

The university announced on Saturday that 70.6 per cent of the respondents thought the prime minister should be selected from among elected MPs, while 29.4 per cent said the prime minister could be an outsider.

The survey comes amid growing speculation that Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the chief of the National Council for Peace and Order, would seek to remain PM after the election as an “outsider” selected by MPs and Senators after the election. The new constitution allows a non-MP to become the prime minister during a five-year transitional period after the military junta’s control ends with an election.

Asked whether they would vote for Prayut to become the prime minister if the election were held today, 36.8 per cent of the respondents said “Yes”, while 34.8 per cent said “No” and the rest said they had no comment.

In May 2017, the university’s survey found that 52.8 per cent of the respondents said they would vote for Prayut as the prime minister.

Prayut recently said Thailand was going to have “Thai-style” democracy after the next election.

Asked what they think about Thai-style democracy, 29.1 per cent of the respondents said it would cause no change to Thai politics, while 27.9 per cent said it would lead to semi-military government politics and 22.5 per cent said it would prompt Thailand to have unity.