A police source told The Nation that officers were ordered to stay overnight at the court on Monday and Tuesday.

Hundreds of crowd control police from the Metropolitan Police Bureau were deployed at the Supreme Court to keep peace and order. Fences were installed in front of the court’s entrance.

On Tuesday at 9.30am, the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division on Political Office Holders will hear a closing statement from former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra in her trial linked to the the controversial rice-pledging scheme.

Yingluck was charged with negligence for allegedly failing to prevent corruption and irregularities in the scheme carried out while she was in office.

The Supreme Court’s Criminal Division on Political Office Holders is set to deliver a verdict in the case on August 25.

On Wednesday, it is scheduled to deliver its verdict in a case involving two former PMs and two former police chiefs for alleged malfeasance after being held responsible for the fatal police crackdown on yellow-shirt protesters on October 7, 2008.

The four defendants are former prime minister Somchai Wongsawat, his then deputy Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who is also an ex-PM, former national police chief General Patcharawat Wongsuwan, and former Metropolitan Police commander Lt-General Suchart Muenkaew.

The incident left two demonstrators dead and 470 injured.

HUNDREDS OF riot police will be deployed at the Supreme Court today as a large number of supporters are expected to show their support for former prime minister Yingluck Shinwatra, who will deliver her closing remarks in her trial related to the controversial rice-pledging scheme.

However, authorities do not have any other special security measures planned and the area in front of the court will not be designated as a controlled space, Army chief General Chalermchai Sitthisart said yesterday.

He added that the court had not requested special security measures and police in charge of both traffic and security would enforce normal laws to keep order in front of the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Political Office Holders.

Police would deploy hundreds of riot control police, including female officers, to guard the area, Deputy Commander of Metropolitan Police Panurat Lakboun said.

Metropolitan Police yesterday called a special meeting to assess preparations to deal with the crowds of Yingluck supporters.

Panurat said the former premier’s supporters had previously behaved and cooperated with police, who expected the same turnout as when she last appeared on July 21.

Meanwhile, red-shirt leader Weng Tojirakarn yesterday warned of possible interference by a group that intended to cause trouble.

“I don’t want to call it a third party. But it is possible that someone with malicious intent towards both Yingluck and the country might intrude and cause mayhem,” he told The Nation. “And you know it could even affect or extend the road map,” he added, referring to the junta’s “road map to democracy”.

Weng added that Yingluck’s supporters wanted to back their “beloved” politician and to offer her flowers, but they did not intend to pressure the court.

Pheu Thai Party politicians have also said they are ready to stand by Yingluck in her final appearance today. Wanata Muangsook, a former minister with multiple portfolios, wrote on Facebook yesterday that he would be at the court today along with his daughter Weerada Muangsook to give Yingluck moral support, despite the government’s warning that he should not attend.

Chaturon Chaisang, another key member of the Pheu Thai Party, wrote on Facebook on Sunday that he would also join people at the court today to support Yingluck.

He said he anticipated that the crowd of supporters would be larger than that which attended the final hearing in the case. But like Weng, Chaturon said he believed Yingluck’s supporters did not intend to pressure police, but only wanted to show their support.

“Any warning will unlikely affect people’s determination to be at the court [today] and on August 25, when the verdict is to be delivered, because it regards people’s free will and is not unlawful,” Chaturon said.

Yingluck is facing charges of negligence for allegedly failing to prevent corruption and irregularities in a rice-pledging scheme that was carried out while she was in office.

That means a new national strategy committee, headed by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, will soon be set up to oversee the country’s 20-year strategy.

The 35-member committee will also consist of top parliamentary officials, currently appointed by the junta, ministers, and commerce and industry chairmen.

The committee is obligated to set up panels to work on various strategies for 30 days. Afterwards, they will have four months to complete the strategies before going to the legal deliberation process for final enactment.

Passed in June, the two laws have drawn mixed public reactions. While some commentators have said a legally binding instrument is essential to guide Thailand, others are concerned that it will not only burden future governments but also ensure that the military-installed regime would maintain power in the future.

The enforcement of the National Reform Bill also constitutionally dissolved the NRSA, appointed by the junta in October 2015 with the task to make so-called reform proposals to government bodies.

The NRSA held its final meeting last Tuesday before officially forwarding reform tasks to Prayut yesterday. NRSA President Captain Tinnaphan Nakata said that 188 reform issues on 37 agendas had been forwarded to Prayut. In the past 10 months, 27 of the 188 issues have been “realised”, Tinnaphan said.

From 27 “urgent agendas” on the NRSA’s past work, 12 would be made into bills or bill drafts, six would come in the form of absolute junta orders, five would be included in a new national economic and social development plan, two would be announcements in the Royal Gazette, and one each would become a decree and 15-year strategy for the Education Ministry, Tinnaphan said.

The reforms span 11 facets, covering organic law drafts on politicians and the Election Commission, new measures on computer crimes, road and community management, the establishment of a corruption court, agriculture management and the digital economy.

Prayut is supposed to move reforms forward as head of the super-committee on national strategy, reform and reconciliation.

Prayut said the reforms would be driven to improve equality issues and strengthen legal enforcement.

“Almost none of the previous governments managed to maintain a four-year term,” Prayut said during his nearly two-hour speech. “So the problem-solving has been on and off, not sustainable.”

He also reiterated that the long-term strategy was meant to set up guidelines for national development, not designed to control future governments.

Only a few days after the NRSA’s last meeting last week, the watchdog iLaw slammed the NRSA for not creating tangible outcomes despite being allocated more than Bt1 billion over the past 22 months.

The majority of the NRSA’s proposals are hazy concepts, iLaw said, coming up with no academic or research endorsements.

They said some proposals could even take the country’s development backwards, including their proposal on media regulation that would allow authorities to interfere in media affairs.

The bill is the second of 10 bills to be written to accompany the new Constitution, which has passed the NLA.

However, the Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC) which had been responsible for writing the original draft objected to some clauses related to the primary voting system. They were concerned that the clauses violated the intent of the Constitution.

The CDC argued that the full version of the sections dealing with internal election of political party candidates could be unconstitutional for at least five reasons. Among them were questions of transparency, which could pave way for possible fraud, and the difficulties posed in the event that local branches of parties could not meet the requirement for 50 members to be present to determine and field a constituency candidate, which could violate a basic political right supported by the charter.

Udom Rathamarit, the, CDC spokesman, said Monday that the joint committee, composed of members of the CDC, NLA, and Electoral Commission, had only agreed on one point, which was to allow the leader of a party to run as a constituency candidate.

Other controversial clauses, he said, were sent back to the CDC for reconsideration. The joint committee would convene again Tuesday to try to reach mutual agreement on those controversial points, he said.

They hoped to table the bill in the NLA meeting this Thursday, Udom said, after being granted 15 days to make the clauses align with the Constitution.

If two-thirds of members of the NLA at the meeting voted down the revised draft, the version passed last month would be submitted to the Cabinet.

Watana Muangsook, a key Pheu Thai Party figure, has defended his plan to gather support for former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, who is soon to hear the court’s verdict in the case concerning her alleged negligence in managing her government’s rice-pledging scheme, arguing that it is “a tradition” to do such a thing and should not require anyone’s permission in the first place.

Watana appeared at the military court on Monday to testify in relation to another charge against him concerning an allegation that he had broken the junta’s temporary release conditions, following his posts during the referendum campaign last year.

He said he would deny that particular charge because he felt that what he had done was not illegal as he was merely expressing his views, and not holding any political activities.

He also mentioned the fresh allegation against him, concerning a planned gathering to give support to Yingluck on August 25, when the Supreme Court’s Division for Holders of Political Positions is due to deliver its much-anticipated ruling in the rice-pledging case.

Pol Colonel Chakrit Sawasdee, deputy commander of the Crime Suppression Division, said on Sunday that the police were considering whether Watana could be deemed to have broken the computer law, Article 14 of which prohibits posting “distorted” information on the Internet.

Last Friday, police filed a complaint against him for breaking the penal code’s Article 116 for instigation, as the former minister had published on his Facebook page several posts referring to what he called the junta government’s “legal bias” against its political opponents.

He also posted about the coming verdict in Yingluck’s case regarding her alleged negligence in managing her administration’s rice-pledging scheme, while calling on her supporters to join him in person at the court on August 25.

Army commander-in-chief General Chalermchai Sitthisad said he had talked with Supreme Commander General Surapong Suwana-at and National Security Council chief Tawip Netniyom about the report.

“We all agreed that we did not have [sufficient] information about the report about Wutthipong Kotchathamkhun. The only information we have is from the media,” he said.

Chalermchai added that he was not sure if Wutthipong, who is also known as “Koh Tee”, was arrested in the neighbouring country because Lao territory was not under his jurisdiction.

“We do not know whether the report is false or not,” he said.

Thai authorities have asked Laos to help capture Wutthipong, who is wanted in Thailand on 21 charges, including lese majeste.

Since the military coup in May 2014, Wutthipong has been living in exile in Laos, where he has regularly hosted a programme broadcast on YouTube. In the programme, he has talked about preparations for an armed “liberation” to form a so-called “federation of Thailand”.

“We do not have enough information on the matter, so we will avoid giving an opinion as it could possibly impact the relationship [with Laos],” Chalermchai said.

Meanwhile, deputy police spokesman Pol Colonel Krissana Pattanacharoen said police would verify the accuracy of the report.

A rumour that Wutthipong was captured in Laos, brought back to Thai soil and killed was first propagated by another fugitive red-shirt supporter, Jom Phetpradab, who is taking refuge in the United States.

NRSA chairman Tinnapan Nakata and Prayut will co-chair the handover ceremony at Parliament.

At the ceremony, Tinnapan will present a report to the premier, who will then give a speech on national strategies, reform and development.

All the so-called “rivers” of reform – the National Council for Peace and Order, the Cabinet, the NRSA, the National Legislative Assembly and the Constitution Drafting Commission, including 900 concerned officials – will attend the event.

The NRSA had its last meeting last Tuesday.

The terms of its members expire when the bill on plans and procedures for national reform is promulgated.

Once the bill is published in the Royal Gazette, the NRSA will be replaced by national reform committees working in 11 areas.

NRSA vice chairman Alongkorn Ponlaboot said the body has presented more than 190 reform reports covering all topics on the reform agenda, such as political, public administrative, economic and social reforms.

All of the reform imperatives are designed to improve the country’s competitive edge, lift living standards, ensure equality and equity, and attain sustainable growth, Alongkorn said.

Alongkorn said almost 70 per cent of the NRSA’s proposals focused on “fixing” what is broken, with 20 per cent focused on building up existing strengths and 10 per cent centred on creating something new.

But it did.

On the morning of October 7, 2008, amid the sound of music from some activists who had taken a break from a long demonstration the previous night, the first can of tear gas suddenly landed, exploding and sending white smoke all around.

Sirichai, who had been relaxing on a truck parked near the gates of Parliament, narrowly escaped by jumping down. He then joined the crowd of 600 to 800 demonstrators who had been resting nearby.

What was about to happen turned out to be one of the most chaotic and deadly scenes in Thai political history.

“The very first tear gas cans were fired from Kattayani Intersection,” Sirichai recalled. “I was fired at, too, and narrowly escaped it. I heard a leader telling the crowd to remain peaceful, but the mood was highly charged already and some of us started to fight back. That’s when the chaos began.”

It was on the night of October 6, 2008, that the leaders of the yellow-shirt People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) resolved to step up pressure on the new prime minister, Somchai Wongsawat – who was Thaksin Shinawatra’s brother-in-law and was viewed as a proxy for the former leader.

Following the 2006 coup, the subsequent election saw the victory of Thaksin’s People Power Party, seen as a reincarnation of his first party, Thai Rak Thai. The PAD, which was formed in late 2005 to pressure Thaksin, resumed again to chase out the PPP-led government.

This happened just three months after Samak Sundaravej, the PPP leader, took office. He was then discharged from the premiership following an allegation concerning a conflict of interest over some TV shows he had hosted.

Somchai replaced him, and he was set to officially announce on October 7 his government policies to Parliament as required by the Constitution at the time .

The PAD, however, called for “final war” against Thaksin’s regime to begin, eventually resulting in a resolution to block Somchai from making that policy address.

“The reason we decided to step up our pressure against the government was because we wanted to end the so-called Thaksin regime and his nominees,” said Suriyasai Katasila, who was then the PAD coordinator.

“We held the months-long demonstration as well as moving to several government compounds as part of our strategies, including Government House, but they had achieved little.

“As the decision was made, we stressed non-violent demonstrations, and prohibited everyone from invading Parliament, because we were aware that they would have guns. Despite those instructions, a sorry state of violence did happen. The strong signal of the violence was that

“My communication with some senior police officers was shut down. They turned off the phones.”

Sirichai and a few other PAD leaders subsequently led the crowd to Parliament in an attempt to block Somchai from entering the building and making his address.

The crowd of some 600 to 800 moved to Parliament on the night on October 6, and surrounded its main gates. A few 10-wheeled trucks with speakers attached to them were dispatched, and PAD leaders took turns speaking during breaks in a mini-concert of folk songs.

It was a peaceful night without any signs of violence, said Sirichai.

The violence broke with that first tear gas canister in the morning, he recalled. Sirichai said he believed that the security officers had tried every means to get parliamentarians into the compound so that the prime minister could give his speech. That’s the reason they decided to use force against the demonstrators.

After being bombarded by a countless number of teargas cans, the demonstrators retreated and parliamentarians, including Somchai, managed to enter the compound.

Around 9.30am, Somchai began to deliver his policy speech, but the situation inside Parliament was not all that smooth. Some senators, particularly the so-called 40 senators, protested, but to no avail.

Somchai managed to finish his speech around 2pm. He left the scene by helicopter, leaving the demonstrators and security officers confronting one another, before the violence broke out again.

His deputy prime minister, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, resigned to take responsibility, but this did not improve the situation outside Parliament. Clashes continued and the number of casualties increased on both sides. One explosion occurred nearby, in front of Chat Thai Party, resultingresulted resulted in the death of Pol Colonel Maethee Chartmontri.

Teargas canisters were fired against the demonstrators again in the evening, when the security officers wanted to force them to give way to allow parliamentarians to leave the compound.

Tear gas was fired until late into the evening, when darkness fell. Clashes were still sporadic and spilled over to some nearby areas. It was near the Police Metropolitan Bureau that Nong Bo, one of the yellow-shirt demonstrators, was killed mysteriously. She had wounds on her stomach and traces of a tear gas canister were found.

“If there was anything that I regret, it would be about our decisions and assessment of the situation at that time,” Sirichai said.

“Also, the state should really not use force and violence against citizens and their non-violent expressions. They should learn to listen and avoid adopting violence as a way to solve a problem.”

The four defendants in the case are top former government figures and high-ranking police officers indicted for malfeasance after being held responsible for the fatal police crackdown on yellow-shirt protesters on October 7, 2008 – an incident that left two demonstrators dead and some 470 others injured.

They are former prime minister Somchai Wongsawat, his then deputy Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, former national police chief General Patcharawat Wongsuwan, and former Metropolitan Police commander Lt-General Suchart Muenkaew.

Somchai, who is the brother-in-law of former PM Thaksin Shina-watra, was the country’s 26th prime minister, serving briefly between September and December 2008.

Throughout his tenure, Somchai never got inside Government House, which had been seized by yellow-shirt protesters. At that time, he also served as leader of the People Power Party, which was viewed as Thaksin’s proxy.

It took more than six years before a case could be filed with the court. The delay was mainly due to differences of opinion between the National Anti-Corruption Commis-sion (NACC) and the Attorney General’s Office.

Just a year after the crackdown on demonstrators who opposed Somchai’s appointment as prime minister, the NACC indicted the senior state officials deemed responsible for alleged malfeasance under the Penal Code and the Anti-Corruption Act.

In 2012, almost three years later, the then-attorney general Julasing Wasantasing decided not to pursue the case due to “certain imperfections” in the NACC’s investigative report. A joint committee set up by the two agencies failed to settle the differences.

After a long wait, in January 2015 the NACC resolved to bring the case to the court by itself, an option that is allowed by law.

The court accepted the case for trial just a month later. The four defendants appeared before court in May that year to deny the charge against them. They were released on bail – Bt9.5 million for Somchai, Bt8 million for Chavalit, and Bt6 million each for Patcharawat and Suchart – on condition that they do not leave the country without court permission.

In its indictment, the NACC held Somchai responsible for the criminal offence in his capacity as the government head. The NACC concluded that he had called a special Cabinet meeting on the night before the police crackdown and assigned Chavalit to oversee an operation to ensure that MPs and senators would be able to get into Parliament to attend Somchai’s declaration of his government’s policies – a process required by law before a new administration officially assumes office.

The Parliament compound by then was surrounded by large groups of protesters affiliated with the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). Police commandos were sent in to disperse them, with teargas being used. Explosions of poor-quality teargas canisters were blamed for a lot of casualties during the crackdown.

In addition to Somchai, the NACC also resolved to indict Chavalit, who was responsible for overseeing the police crackdown, Patcharawat for failing to prevent the loss of lives as head of the police force, and Suchart for being in charge of the operation.

During the court trial, the four defendants asked for public prosecutors to be appointed as their defence lawyers. They argued that they deserved legal assistance from public prosecutors because the case resulted from their work as state officials. However, the nine judges hearing the cases voted 8-1 to reject the request. The judges explained that according to the relevant law, public prosecutors must not represent the defendants in a case in which a state agency is the plaintiff. The judges concluded that public prosecutors are not authorised to act as the defence’s lawyers.

The defendants produced a list of more than 600 witnesses but the court cut down the number to 100. However, the defence eventually had only 19 “really necessary” witnesses to testify, after consulting with the judges involved in the case. That was compared to 66 prosecution witnesses originally suggested by the NACC, which was cut down to 20 by the court.

The hearing of the witnesses from both parties began in April, 2016, and was just completed in June this year.

In an apparent attempt to undermine the NACC’s case, Somchai asked the court to summon the anti-graft agency’s report in a separate investigation of former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his ex-deputy Suthep Thaugsuban, from the rival Democrat Party.

In that case, the NACC concluded that Abhisit and Suthep committed no wrongdoing for the fatal military crackdown on red-shirt protesters during their government’s tenure in 2010. The court rejected Somchai’s request, explaining that the two incidents were unrelated and there were no reasons to summon documents regarding the other case.

That verdict is expected to have impacts on both future economic policies and the political landscape. We examine some of the issues raised by the rice saga.

IS THE RICE-PLEDGING SCHEME REALLY BAD?

From an economic point of view, buying large quantities of rice from farmers would offer the wrong incentive, encouraging farmers to grow more rice and reinforce downward price pressure on the crop.

Government involvement in the rice trade is prone to poor management and corruption. Politicians and officials do not specialise in the rice trade and they do not care much about public money. In contrast, private rice traders must be very careful, otherwise they could go bankrupt or be cheated by other parties.

WHY IS A BAD POLICY SO HARD TO AVOID?

Large numbers of people depend on rice farming although the farm sector is much smaller compared with the industry and services sectors. The farm sector is only eight per cent of Thai gross domestic product, but 3.7 million families – about 15 million of the nation’s 68 million people – are dependent on rice farming. Politicians want to serve the demands of their large voter base, so the conditions are ripe for populist policies.

HOW MUCH DID THE PAST RICE POLICY COST AND HOW MUCH CAN WE TOLERATE?

The government estimated the cost of the rice-pledging scheme during the Yingluck administration (2011 to 2014) was about Bt500 billion. On the other hand, the Pheu Thai Party argued the cost would have been much lower had the current government properly managed the rice auction.

The previous ruling party also said the financial impact was under control during the implementation of the rice scheme. Yet no one would know the real cost until stockpiled rice is all sold. The party also argued that it had controlled potential damage while helping several million farmers.

The cost and benefits of the project are debatable.

HOW DOES THE FUTURE FARM POLICY EVOLVE?

Populist policies may not go away as elected governments would continue to be under high pressure from constituent demand. There would be pressure to help farmers and labourers until they could find higher-income jobs in other sectors.

Close to 40 per cent of Thailand’s total labour pool depends on the farm sector, so populist policies would not go away, said Soraphol Tulayasathien, director of the economic stability analysis division at the Fiscal Policy Office.

Short-term market intervention would be necessary. Insurance against the impact of weather |conditions – natural disasters, |flooding and drought – may be a |partial substitute, but it is unlikely to replace populist policies.

WILL A VERDICT ON YINGLUCK’S CASE EXACERBATE THE POLITICAL DIVISION?

Many middle-class people in big cities would continue to voice their opposition to a rice-pledging policy should a newly elected government reintroduce it. But people in rural areas would welcome it. Then the question of who is right and who is wrong could depend on the voter’s vested interest. It would be hard to find a political consensus on the farm issue and the welfare of farmers.

WILL LEGAL ACTION STEMMING FROM THE RICE-PLEDGING SCHEME AFFECT EFFORTS FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION?

With the ongoing legal and legislative actions taken in the tenure of a post-coup administration, it is not easy to convince political adversaries that the measures are fair. The cases impact not only politicians who are accused of corruption or negligence but also their political base. Hence, ongoing efforts for political reconciliation might be adversely affected.