The spending rise will also boost the public debt-to-GDP ratio to between 44 and 48 per cent, though that is still far below the 60-per-cent threshold that would trigger concern.

However, an export slowdown since the start of this year and high household debt have remained hindrances to GDP growth, which is forecast at 2.8-3 per cent for 2016.

Nalin Chutchotitham, an economist at the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp (HSBC), said disbursements for infrastructure projects were insignificant in the 2015 fiscal year while the 2016 fiscal year, which ends on September 30, saw just a slight increase.

But this will likely gain momentum in next year, since 12 of 20 projects worth a combined Bt1.8 trillion have already been approved by the government.

This will increase the country’s nominal GDP by 0.7 of a percentage point in the upcoming fiscal year.

According to HSBC’s Asean economist Joseph Incalcaterra, infrastructure spending has picked up in most Asean countries, contributing to the region’s ongoing economic growth.

The region’s six major economies need an estimated US$2.1 trillion in combined infrastructure spending towards 2030, but their current spending plans amount to just $910 billion.

For Thailand, the estimated spending requirement is $153 billion. Indonesia has the biggest requirement of $1.162 trillion, compared with the Philippines’ $376 billion, Vietnam’s $259 billion and Malaysia’s $109 billion.

It’s not just Thailand that is embarking on a public spending spree for infrastructure. New governments in the Philippines and Indonesia have also turned to hefty infrastructure spending to boost growth amid the export slowdown, low commodity prices and high household debts.

While the funding needs of Asean countries for public infrastructure projects are huge, the role of private-sector money remains relatively small at this stage.

In public-private sector participation (PPP) programmes in Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines, private-sector funding is concentrated in the sectors of information and communication technology, and electricity.

The Philippine PPP programmes are estimated to account for just $3 billion annually out of a total funding requirement of $25 billion per year, while Indonesia’s PPP programmes are forecast to account for 37 per cent of the total funding needs.

As for Thailand, the 12 approved projects are worth a combined Bt510 billion, or about 3.4 per cent of GDP, with mass transit lines, railways, expressways and motorways either in the pipeline or already being built.

In addition, the government has approved a Bt100-billion infrastructure fund to raise money in the equity market to finance these schemes, using existing income-generating projects as key assets.

To meet its aim of turning Thailand into a regional transport hub, the government also envisions an additional 905km of double-track railways to increase speed and links with neighbouring countries.

In addition, Thailand will spend Bt20 billion to implement projects for the digital economy and society, including Bt15 billion for broadband Internet for 39,000 villages.

Following the overwhelming endorsement of the military-backed constitution in last month’s referendum, the surveys present further evidence of widespread public support for the coup leader.

Politicians can no longer afford to wait and see if the Constitution Drafting Commission drafts an organic law to dissolve political parties. If they sit still now, it could be too late to win back people’s trust and stem the flow of popularity towards the junta chief.

Instead they urgently need to restructure their parties and reform themselves to meet public expectations. The message from the referendum and opinion polls should be especially alarming for the major parties. Pheu Thai and the Democrats desperately need to revamp themselves.

As both parties appear to be up against just one strong competitor – General Prayut – their first question is who to choose as leader for the general election next year.

Democrat incumbent Abhisit Vejjajiva, who opposed the draft charter, says he is willing to continue in the role if his members back him. He could be re-elected for a fourth successive term at the end of next year, when his current tenure ends.

The Democrat Party’s election of executives would take place close to the date of the next election as scheduled by the junta’s road map.

Pheu Thai, meanwhile, might be compared to a headless chicken. Fugitive ex-premier ThaksinShinawatra is looking for a suitable person to replace acting leader Viroj Pao-in.

Pheu Thai’s status looks more shaky that that of the Democrats because its real bosses, Thaksinand his sister Yingluck, are seen as the main opponents by the junta.

In contrast, many Democrat politicians have maintained a close relationship with former party secretary-general Suthep Thaugsuban, who is currently chairman of the People’s Democratic Reform Foundation and also has close ties with the junta.

It’s unlikely that the junta will allow a party dominated by the Shinawatras to rise from the grave, after administrations led by two members of the family were overthrown by successive military coups.

Generally, politicians prefer to be members of a coalition party in government rather than be sitting on the opposition benches. Pheu Thai politicians are no exception. But the chances of them forming the next government may be zero.

Hence, political observers foresee disarray for Pheu Thai. Some members may seek to defect and join other parties to ensure a better political future. A former Pheu Thai government minister, who asked not to be named, recently told reporters that he was looking for a new party.

If the worst comes to the worst, the party could be torn apart, with only the most loyal Shinawatra followers opting to stay.

Thaksin, who has lived in exile overseas since 2008, now has a choice to make: compromise, or continue fighting the military-backed regime.

A leader willing to compromise and forge a relationship with the military regime could rescue his party, but that would also risk triggering a mass defection by Pheu Thai members opposed to the dictatorship, which could sink the party.

Former PM Thaksin has been feeling the heat from legal action taken against those close to him during his post-coup government’s tenure. His sister Yingluck is also fighting criminal charges related to her government’s rice-pledging scheme, with jail time beckoning if she is found guilty.

The organic law on political parties might not end up resetting the political landscape, but other developments could set Thaksin back to square one.

jintana@nationgroup.com

The EC seems to be the main target of the proposed changes, since it will be tasked with organising the poll. The National Reform Steering Assembly’s political reform committee has proposed that certain other state agencies, including the Interior Ministry, should help the EC in this task, in order to help ensure transparency and prevent fraud.

Meechai Ruchupan, chairman of the Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC), appears to agree with the NRSA panel that the EC lacks efficiency. He suggested that the election commissioners need to work proactively rather than defensively, as was the case in the past.

“Like the previous constitution, the draft charter that was approved in the referendum requires that the EC oversee elections. In practice, the EC is allowed to assign other state agencies to help. In the past, the EC did all the work by itself, including issuing the regulations and holding elections. That was why the previous general election ran into problems,” Meechai said.

“The CDC wants the EC to work proactively. They should not just wait for complaints. We want the EC to look for possible acts of fraud and take action immediately,” he said.

The chief constitution drafter has disclosed that a CDC working group is examining India’s election commission for lessons on efficiency. He pointed out that the Indian commission has only about 100 election supervisors, in addition to one election commissioner, for a country with the population of over 1 billion.

“We will study and determine how we can apply the Indian format to Thailand,” Meechai said.

The goal is to organise elections at all levels with maximum efficiency and a minimum number of state officials involved.

General Nakorn Sukprasert, an NRSA member and former member of the now-defunct Constitution Drafting Committee that was succeeded by the CDC, suggested the organic law should empower the EC to engage the help of other state agencies in organising elections whenever needed. He also proposed that, to ensure transparency, the new law should specify punishment for any election official deemed failing in the task of ensuring a free and fair election.

The proposals appear aimed at boosting the efficiency of the election process. But they are also expected to introduce mechanisms to screen politicians seeking election to Parliament. For advocates, those mechanisms would help ensure that the 2014 military coup and subsequent reform push of the National Council for Peace and Order is not “wasted”.

If polls for MPs as well as local administrators and councillors can be made free and fair, with fraud a thing of the past, those across all sectors – and not just the same old group of politicians – will be encouraged to contest elections with confidence in a genuinely democratic process.

Such an election process would draw wide acceptance from both Thai society and the wider world community, benefiting our politics and the country as a whole.

Khanittha@nationgroup.com

Some observers anticipate that this week’s 28th and 29th Asean Summits will finally yield a unified resolution on the territory disputes from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, several of whose members are claimants.

They will be disappointed.

The presence in Laos of world leaders like US President Barack Obama and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang will generate headlines, but no solution per se to the region’s No 1 security issue.

Asean member-countries Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam have been at loggerheads with China over longstanding overlapping territory claims in the troubled sea.

The regional grouping fears losing its so-called “centrality” in the regional security architecture if it fails to declare its position on the disputes. While its members struggle to define their “common interest” in the sea, leaders in the bloc feel they must speak with one voice on the issue. But so far they have stopped short at merely raising their “concerns” over the situation, wary of stepping into a territory so fraught with tension.

While finding common ground in affirming freedom of navigation and the need for peaceful resolution in accordance with international law, individual members of the grouping each harbour different national interests in their dealings with China.

Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, which are not claimants in the disputes, enjoy close economic bonds with China that benefit their development as well as regional integration and connectivity.

Thailand has leant on China for support after international criticism over the 2014 coup. The military-backed government sees Beijing as a major ally in its efforts to boost a sluggish economy, although a joint train deal is still in limbo. The military is also mulling deals with China to diversify its hardware and equipment. Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan says a Bt36-billion submarine deal will be completed before the junta leaves office.

Laos and Cambodia rely on Chinese assistance, trade and investment and have never hid where their national interests lie. Beijing has also made clear its readiness to exercise influence over these countries whenever Asean pushes for a collective voice on the South China Sea.

It would be a big surprise if Asean even made public mention of the recent Permanent Court of Arbitration verdict against China’s claim in the South China Sea.

Beijing has made clear that it will not deal with Asean collectively over the territory spats and instead favours a country-by-country approach. For China, any “meddling” by Asean or other “outside” powers, notably the United States, would complicate the issue.

The Philippines, under the leadership of the maverick Rodrigo Duterte, might prefer Beijing’s approach and find a way to make bilateral deal.

Meanwhile if fellow claimant Vietnam can also find ways to deal with China over the disputes, it might be unnecessary for Asean to speak up on the contentious issue.

The remaining task for Asean in its bid for “centrality”, is to focus on establishing a code of conduct for the South China Sea.

That job is not easy, either.

Asean has decades of experience in forging such codes with China. The current instrument, called the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and signed in 2002, was the result of long diplomatic struggling. It eventually became a non-binding accord thanks to pressure from Beijing. The attempt to replace it with a genuine and legally binding code began in 2011. Five years later, the group his yet to produce even a single draft of a new code of conduct for the South China Sea.

 

The spectre is more scary still, since the minister proposed using the coup leader’s absolute power under Article 44 to shorten otherwise lengthy environmental and health assessment processes that have been an obstacle to the project’s progress.

The Maewong Dam has been on and off the table for nearly 30 years since it was first proposed in the early 1990s by the Irrigation Department. Preventing implementation are serious concerns over potentially serious environmental impacts on Maewong National Park in Nakhon Sawan.

Those concerns grew recently when scientists found evidence that endangered species like tigers have spread into Maewong from the adjacent Huai Kha Khaeng, a world heritage wildlife sanctuary.

Besides the ecological argument, environmentalists have also challenged official claims about economic benefits the dam would bring. Environmentalists say that alternative water management provisions in the target areas downstream could match the storage capacity of a dam – 200-250 million cubic metres – and slash state spending from Bt15 billion to about Bt2 billion.

Critically, the state has failed to justify its own claim for the need to build a dam in the national park, which is located outside the country’s main water regulation system of the Chao Phraya basin. Given its relatively remote location, the proposed barrier would have only localised benefits for certain rice-growing, drought-plagued districts of the province, a fact which contradicts the state’s claim of wider benefits.

Apparently stymied by the stronger arguments offered by opponents of the dam, the state has now decided to resort to the absolute power of Article 44. But this has broader and more dangerous implications than impacts from building the dam.

By overriding checks and balances on development through the use of Article 44, the state is now implicitly eroding the spirit of democracy it aims to revive following the August 7 referendum.

Public participation is fundamental to the health of a democracy, of which development projects and public policy are core ingredients. By using Article 44, the state is itself undermining the democracy it wishes to cultivate.

Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha began this illogical process a few months by invoking Article 44 to pave the way for mega-development projects to run in parallel with environmental and health impact assessments, rather than waiting for the green light. That act was seen as overruling the rule of law under the prime environmental law. So far, no one knows which projects have gone ahead under this order, escaping thorough public scrutiny.

The use of Article 44 to force through development projects and public policy must stop. If the government wants to prove it is sincere about returning democracy to the country, the Maewong Dam project would be a good place to start.

pypostbox@yahoo.com

The official results show 61.35 per cent (16.8 million) supported the charter draft while 58.07 per cent (15.1 million) endorsed the additional proposal to allow the 250 appointed senators to join 500 elected MPs in selecting the next prime minister.

The results were also seen as a thumbs-down for politicians, with the majority of voters defying the public stance taken against the charter by the two major parties, Pheu Thai and the Democrats.

Following the draft’s approval, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) chief appears more confident about his popularity and believes he is in his strongest position since staging the coup two years ago.

Some reckon the 62-year-old coup-maker’s chances of becoming the country’s next top leader are now very bright indeed. Why?

Prayut has no need to set up a new party or run for election, since he can rely for parliamentary support on his “own party” – the 250 senators appointed by the NCPO and authorised to vote for the next prime minister.

And Prayut might not find himself lonely in the House of Representatives.

Paiboon Nititawan, a former senator and ex-member of the now-defunct National Reform Council, has announced his intention to set up a new political party, named People’s Reform, to supportPrayut as the next premier. Some small and medium-sized parties are reportedly ready to follow suit.

National Legislative Assembly members went even further, pushing for the 250 hand-picked senators to be permitted to not just vote for a prime minister but also name their own candidate.

Post-referendum surveys also indicated popular endorsement of almost every aspect of Prayut‘s rule, with most respondents willing to support him as an “outsider” prime minister, not drawn from the elected lower House.

A Super Poll released on Sunday found that 87.2 per cent of respondents agreed that Prayut should stay on as premier after the next election. The poll was conducted from August 25-27 on 1,590 people.

Apart from identifying the lack of a better choice, the respondents thought Prayut was honest, determined, able to control the situation, exercise his absolute power via Article 44 with good results, combat corruption and show more effective leadership.

Amid such public endorsement, it was no surprise to see Prayut rush to announce his desire to serve as prime minister after the next election.

“Even though the work is harder and I am not paid for it, I would be pleased to stay on. But I will stay through democratic means and in a dignified way, although I don’t know now how that will come,” the NCPO chief, who has ruled the country since seizing power in May 2014, said last Friday.

Prayut had previously been reluctant to declare his plans, perhaps wary that history might repeat itself.

After staging a coup in 1991, former Army chief Gen Suchinda Kraprayoon vowed he had no interest in becoming premier, only to reverse that promise at the invitation of five parties – Samakkitham, Chart Thai, Social Action, Thai Citizen and Rassadorn – following the March 1992 general election. The coup-maker’s return under democratic conditions ignited a mass protest that led to the infamous Black May of 1992, when soldiers opened fire on unarmed demonstrators, killing scores if not hundreds.

Despite the support pouring in for Prayut to take the job as an “outsider”, he can choose either to be an “invited outsider” or an elected premier.

Like others, Prayut may interpret the referendum result as an endorsement for extending his rule. But he cannot afford to ignore calls from political parties that he first run for election.

Declaring that you want to stay on as leader in a dignified way after democracy is restored, means you have to be elected by the people – not “invited” to take the top post.

Only the former course would be dignifying.

jintana@nationgroup.com

The question is, who and what should be blamed?

Most fingers are pointing at the so-called “loose tooth” – the missing link between Tao Poon Station and the MRT subway.

Others are blaming high ticket fares for discouraging commuters.

Under the government’s guidance, the board of the Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA) on Wednesday agreed to cut the fares by almost a half, and the price to park-and-ride by the same.

The new Purple Line fares will begin at Bt14 for a one-station ride, rising by Bt1 per station up to a maximum at Bt29. The rate had been Bt14 up to a Bt42 maximum.

The new fare structure will come into effect next Thursday and operate until the “loose tooth” is fixed, which is expected by the middle of next year.

However the MRTA forecasts the fare cut will boost passenger numbers on the Purple Line by just 30 per cent – or 6,000 per day. The resulting figure will still be a long way short of the target.

Critics have said the extension of the MRT Blue Line should have been completed before the launch of the Purple Line, to ensure smooth passage into the central business district for commuters from the northern suburbs.

But work on the Blue Line extension has been dogged by delays caused by confusion among authorities over the physical route it should take. Compounding the problem is the red tape involved in the selection process for an operator and other stakeholders, with decisions being made and reviewed in a back-and-forth process between a number of official committees.

More time is taken up for the bidding process to find operators and negotiate over the operation of each Blue Line extension, meaning more delays.

Things changed, though, when the junta invoked Article 44 of the interim charter, which offers a potential quick-fix to problems regarding the missing link between the Blue Line and Purple Line, and also finding an operator for Blue Line extensions. The selection process has been altered in favour of negotiations with the current operator of the MRT Blue Line to run the line’s extensions. The negotiations, however, will be proceeded by work in committees at the junta’s order and under a strict timeframe.

If things go as planned, the missing link will be filled by the middle of next year.

sasithorn@nationgroup.com

The Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC) is now tasked with amending the charter draft to reflect those new Senatorial powers. But that process is proving far from simple.

There have been attempts to “interpret” the additional question in a way that would allow senators to also nominate prime ministerial candidates, rather than merely voting on candidates put forward by the elected lower House. The intention behind those attempts remains unclear. It’s difficult to say whether the proponents have the public interest in mind, or benefits of their own narrow group.

The additional question was, in truth, rather long and confusing. It asked voters: “Do you agree that, for the benefit of continuous national reform under the national strategy, it should be stated in the draft constitution’s Transitory Clauses that during the first five years of the first Parliament under the new constitution, both Houses shall jointly consider whether to approve the person suitable to be appointed as prime minister?”

However, the gist was clear: Do you agree that senators should join MPs in voting to select the prime minister. That was the meaning generally understood by voters who cast ballots in the referendum.

Yet some members of the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), which originally proposed the additional question, have insisted that the words “jointly consider whether to approve” also meant senators should be allowed to nominate prime ministerial candidates.

They claim the question can be interpreted two ways – in a narrow manner and a wider manner. Narrowly interpreted, the question refers only to allowing senators to vote, but a wider interpretation would also cover their power to nominate candidates.

Earlier this week, NLA president Pornpetch Wichitcholchai backed the so-called wider interpretation by saying selected senators should also be able to put forward their candidate. The referendum question had asked voters if they would allow senators to “take part” in the process of approving a new prime minister, which Pornpetch claimed included nominating candidates: “The process of approval is not limited to just voting to approve or not.”

A former a Supreme Court judge, Pornpetch compared the process to a court trial where a judge hears witnesses and also delivers a verdict.

The question is whether the “wider interpretation” is merely a case of voters giving an inch and the powers-that-be taking a mile.

Jetn Sirathranont, an NLA representative who consulted on the matter with the constitution drafters, said the additional proposal was worded in the shortest way the assembly could manage. He added that more than one question would have been needed in order to cover all the aspects.

That remark effectively confirmed that the additional proposal covered only one aspect – whether to allow senators to vote in selecting a prime minister.

Exactly why one group is insisting 250 NCPO-selected senators be allowed to nominate a prime ministerial candidate remains unclear. But the reason should be known before long.

attayuth@nationgroup.com

The phrase first emerged just before referendum day via a government spokesperson: “Don’t be afraid of the ghosts that you can’t see when casting votes in the referendum. Be afraid of ghosts that haunted us earlier.”

With “ghosts that haunted us earlier”, Prayut was reprising his much-repeated criticism of former governments, whose corruption and political divisiveness he cites as reasons for the 2014 military intervention.

But what of the “ghosts that we can’t see”? What exactly is it that the premier deems unworthy of our fear?

With the referendum over, the spotlight has swung to the question of who will be next prime minister. With the military in control of both the country and the charter drafting process, speculation is that Prayut will extend his tenure at the top.

The junta chief is famous for speaking bluntly, but has so far been cagey about his future. “It is too early to say anything,” is his typical response to questions on the subject. “It’s no use being afraid of ghosts you can’t see yet.”

It seems Prayut is telling people to not worry about the path taken to the next general election, which is being plotted behind closed doors by junta-appointed officials, amid an ongoing ban against political gatherings and under absolute power afforded by Article 44 of the interim charter.

Referendum voters also approved a proposal for the junta-selected Senate to join the elected lower house in selecting the prime minister for the first five years of the next parliament.

The powers-that-be are now debating how to put that process into practice. The draft constitution says candidates for prime minister should be drawn from the lists of political parties, with the Senate only allowed to intervene in the selection process if the lower house cannot do the job. But the National Legislative Assembly has called for the Senate to have the right to name its own candidate from the beginning.

Is this the ghost Prayut is telling people not to fear?

Another question: If he doesn’t want people to fear this spectre, why bring it up at all and thereby risk our suspicion that there is something to hide?

This is not the first time Prayut has raised the issue of political fear. Prior to the referendum, he declined to outline what would happen if voters rejected the proposed charter, merely saying he would be responsible for composing the next draft.

That uncertainty invited fear that something unpredictable and worse might follow a “no” vote.

Every good military general utilises psychological tactics to win his battles. But in his role as the country’s leader, Prayut has a duty to minimise public fear rather than magnify it with ambiguous and provocative statements.

With the current post-referendum situation of relative stability, he can afford to start now, by easing the clampdown on free expression and political activity and relinquishing some of his sweeping powers.

This would improve his administration’s image as well as proving to some that claims to be forging a path back to democratic civilian rule are not empty.

wasamon.mint@gmail.com