That idea would likely save the country millions of baht – but at a cost of depriving people of their basic rights.

The Finance Ministry has proposed ending the elderly living allowances for those with a monthly income of more than Bt9,000 or total assets of more than Bt3 million.

The idea has been floated as part of plans for our ageing society, which risks economic decline as the number of seniors grows faster than that of working-age citizens.

Currently, Thailand is home to 10.78 million seniors, 75 per cent of whom are paid elderly care allowances, worth a total Bt63 billion per year.

Thai society has been greying since 2004 and is forecast to reach UNESCAP’s definition of an “ageing society” by the year 2025, when the percentage of citizens aged 60 or above is expected to hit 20 per cent and those aged 65-plus 15 per cent.

On the positive side, the government seems to be targeting budget at those seniors most in need, which would help reduce the burden on state spending. However, the reality as pointed out by critics is that the government spends as much as Bt140 billion on pension funds for 600,000 civil servants while budgeting only Bt63 billion for the almost 10 million seniors not covered by the state welfare programme.

Subsidies for old-age citizens were launched in 1992 during Chuan Leekpai’s government, at Bt200 per person per year. In 2006, the minimum subsidy was raised to Bt500, with a limit set at Bt1,000 in line with budget support from each local administration, and prioritised underprivileged seniors.

In 2010, the elderly living allowance was revised on a “fair and equal” basis. This made eligible for payments all seniors aged 60-plus who received no income in the form of pension funds, salary or state welfare.

During Yingluck Shinawatra’s government, the subsidy paid to seniors was Bt600 for those over 60 and Bt1,000 for those over 90.

Meanwhile a more selective method of payment that targets certain groups according to income likely won’t work in practice. How can authorities ensure it targets the right groups and effectively so? Some may have no job and assets yet in fact be wealthy as others own assets for them. Others may barely scrape by, but still exceed the income level below which they would be entitled to state aid.

What the government should do instead is encourage the private sector to keep on ageing employees and push private companies to provide workers with provident funds. These measures would be a more effective way of reducing the state’s burden.

Sasithorn@nationgroup.com

This week has seen commemorations in honour of the ordinary people who rose up in the hope of ridding Thailand of dictatorship once and for all. But those hopes proved to be in vain.

In 1988, Chart Thai Party leader Chatichai Choonhavan became the first elected prime minister in more than a decade after his party won a parliamentary majority and formed a coalition government. Chatichai’s ascension to the top political job came after General Prem Tinsulanonda, having already served as prime minister for eight years, turned down an offer to head the new coalition administration.

Under Chatichai’s leadership the economy grew more than 10 per cent per year on a policy to “turn the battlefield into the market” by boosting trade ties with war-wearied neighbouring countries. The goal for Thailand was to become Asia’s fifth “economic tiger”.

With his military background, General Chatichai was well aware of the ongoing political instability and met leaders of the armed forces leaders each week in a bid to shore up his government’s position.

However, the perennial problem of corruption seemed to dog his administration. When the NPKC staged a coup in 1991, “severe corruption” was cited as one of the five reasons, along with abuse of power by politicians, the government’s parliamentary dictatorship, undermining of the military, and distortion of lese majeste cases.

The power seizure was initially welcomed by the public, especially when the coup-makers named respected former diplomat Anand Panyarachun as prime minister.

However, public sentiment towards the NPKC turned negative after it became clear they were bidding to hold onto power after fresh elections. A new constitution written by a team led by Meechai Ruchupan allowed a non-MP to become prime minister. Pro-military party Samakkhi Tham won the subsequent general election in March 1992 but party leader Narong Wongwan had been blacklisted by the United States for alleged involvement in the drug trade. The allegation was never proven, but it was sufficient to end Narong’s prime ministerial hopes.

Instead, General Suchinda assumed the post, despite having previously promised in public that he would not become prime minister. His rise to power infuriated many ordinary citizens and prompted the popular uprising. Anti-Suchinda demonstrations started in late April 1992 and reached their climax on May 17, when dozens were killed in a military crackdown. Many Black May protesters remain missing to this day.

There are striking similarities between the aftermath of the NPKC coup of 1991 and the power seizure by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) in 2014. These include the reasons cited for staging the coup, certain figures involved, clauses in the resulting constitutions, and also concern at the coup-makers apparent bid to extend their power beyond fresh elections.

However, unlike the NPKC, whose support base was limited to security forces, the NCPO is also backed by a significant section of the general public. Many of these citizens would likely be willing to take to the streets to protect a military-led government if need be. Meanwhile, another swathe of Thai society would likely rise against any imposition of Army rule over a civilian administration.

Nobody knows how long this fragile peace will continue. The “last straw” could well be public discontent over the extension of junta power.

Twenty-four years after Black May, we still can’t agree whether the prime minister must be elected. And that’s after dozens laid down their lives to uphold this principle.

Only the NCPO can ensure that history doesn’t repeat itself. The junta has to make its policy clear, in actions as well as words.

The Asean principle of non-interference has led to a reluctance to speak out against neighbours’ rights abuses, a shameful case in point furnished by junta-ruled Myanmar. Now, that shame is deepening thanks to the silence over Thailand’s deepening human rights crisis.

While the international community’s rising concern resulted in concrete recommendations for Thailand during the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Periodic Review in Geneva last week, representatives from Asean member countries were conspicuous by their silence, declining to make serious comment on the ongoing violation of civil and political rights in Thailand.

Indeed few expected any useful recommendations from the current chair of Asean, Laos, which has long been a stranger to international standards of civil and political rights.

The Lao delegation in Geneva instead recommended that Thailand empower women and ensure equal access to education for females, rural children and the disabled. The irony of those suggestions – coming just two years after male generals toppled a female prime minister and her government in Thailand – was obviously lost on the Vientiane officials.

Given that all governments in Asean are authoritarian, differing only in the degree of their control, their lack of serious comment on the violation of civil and political rights in Thailand came as no surprise. It would not be unusual for countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, et al to arrest the mother of a student activist on a charge of insulting the head of state just because she acknowledged a Facebook post. Those countries might have no lese majeste law, but their internal security and sedition acts are enforced in the same manner.

However, it was disappointing to see representatives of elected civilian governments in Indonesia, the Philippines and notably Myanmar, fall into step with their neighbours in Geneva. These three are supposedly among the more democratically progressive members of Asean and thus have a duty to set the tone on regional human right practice.

An Indonesian representative in Geneva cut corners by suggesting that Thai authorities strengthen the legal framework, support the national human rights body and maintain efforts to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.

The Philippines followed suit by recommending Bangkok continue to provide resources and laws to protect women’s rights, and implement policies enunciated in the national human rights plan. It also urged Thailand to consider ratification of international instruments to protect migrant workers.

Even more disappointing was to see that Myanmar’s representative remained wedded to the ethos of the previous military regime. The message of openness and rights protections from the new government under democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi had seemingly not yet got through to the Geneva delegation. Instead they focused exclusively on the rights of the millions of Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand.

As foreign minister, Suu Kyi has the urgent task of mapping out a national agenda and employing her envoys around the globe to champion the resulting policies.

Thailand was once a beacon for human rights and democracy in Asean. Bangkok even saw fit occasionally to comment on rights violations in military-ruled Myanmar. Now, the world has changed, and it’s Myanmar’s turn to do the job.

This, he claims, would benefit ordinary demonstrators whose political passions boiled over into violating the law in the heat of the moment.

Details of the proposal remain hazy, but some legal experts say it differs from the conventional judicial practice of applying a penalty that is subsequently suspended in order to give someone found guilty of a minor offence the chance to correct their behaviour.

Seree said his committee had been working on reconciliation efforts for some time, and he revealed the fruit of their deliberations in response to journalists’ questions. Though he declined to term the idea an “amnesty”, he said dealing with ordinary demonstrators in this way would help heal the nationwide political rift.

Yesterday, he urged former protest leaders to put aside their egos and support the proposal so that their supporters could be freed from legal burdens and reconciliation be given a chance to grow.

Seree’s call makes sense in terms of the lifting the legal pressure on thousands of ordinary demonstrators, but big questions remain over whether it can help bring reconciliation.

Victims of political violence have spoken out against the proposal. Among them is Adul Khiewboriboon, chairman of the Relatives of the Black May Heroes group, who says victims’ demand is for truth and justice before healing and compensation.

As such, Seree’s idea reflects a major flaw in ongoing reconciliation efforts and has prompted concern that it would deepen rather than heal the political rift.

The proposal is too narrow to address the issues fuelling division, including the legitimate demands for justice being made by victims. It apparently seeks a judicial shortcut when only a much wider process of investigation and truth-finding can bring resolution to the political conflict.

Reconciliation needs a foundation of truth-seeking as well as time to evolve – something recognised by the victims of political violence, peace advocates and even Anek Laothammatas’s reconciliation committee under the now-defunct National Reform Council (NRA).

The six steps towards reconciliation proposed by Anek’s committee began with fact-finding and revealing the truth, however painful to some. This would forge a basis for a joint understanding of the incidents, the second step. Then an atmosphere of contrition and forgiveness would have a chance to grow, with legal channels also helping to bring justice. The process would be completed with efforts towards rehabilitation and compensation, and the promotion of a supportive environment with rule of law plus preventative measures against the use of violence to solve conflict.

The process thus progresses in steps and takes time.

Seree’s proposal might indeed have merits, but to achieve permanent reconciliation, we need to return to the more considered process laid out under the NRA. Otherwise we risk a misstep that could leave us even further from our destination of political peace.

Piyaporn_won@nationgroup.com

Seree Suwanpanont, chairman of the National Reform Steering Assembly’s political reform committee, carefully avoided the term “amnesty”. Nevertheless, his proposal is to lift the threat of penalties against those who have pleaded guilty to crimes committed in connection with the last decade of political unrest. Included in this category would be protesters who occupied and shut down road intersections, state agencies and airports. However the proposed law would not cover cases of corruption, arson and lese majeste.

Defending the proposal, Seree, a lawyer, explained the idea of suspending penalties wasn’t new but was already incorporated in the penal code. He said that to benefit, offenders would first have to confess before the court. Fugitives and those who refused to confess to their crimes would not be eligible.

Anyone granted a reprieve would be subject to life-long probation, banned from political rallies or inciting unrest and forfeit their voting rights for life. Failure to comply would trigger the original punishment.

“Penalty suspension differs from amnesty. When granted amnesty, offenders are not subject to any prohibitions. But penalty suspension will come with a lot of prohibitions attached, to help prevent offenders from re-offending,” Seree explained.

The proposal met with vociferous opposition from the rival political groups that led street protests over the past decade. Key figures from the red-shirt United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) and the now-defunct yellow-shirt People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) have spoken out against the idea.

One-time PDRC spokesman Akanat Promphan said that none of the group’s leaders were seeking any form of amnesty.

“We made considered judgements before acting [in committing the alleged offences]. We will accept whatever the court rules,” he said. “Nobody can deny the need for reconciliation. But nobody should try to link it to amnesty or any form of whitewashing of the wrongdoing.”

UDD chief Jatuporn Prompan said, “We did not do anything wrong. Why should we confess?”

He added that he would continue with his court battle.

It was hardly surprising that both groups disagreed with Seree’s proposal. The PDRC took to the streets to protest against the bill for a blanket amnesty pushed by the Yingluck Shinawatra government, and will be reluctant to betray that original principle.

Meanwhile the UDD maintains it is innocent regarding the many offences committed during the political unrest in 2009 and 2010. It also claims that, by suspending penalties against those who seized airports, the proposal seemed aimed at benefiting a particular group of people. Seizure of an airport comes under the Terrorism Act and is thus no ordinary political offence, say UDD leaders.

The proposal is a hot potato now scalding the hands of the government. Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan reportedly voiced his opposition on grounds that such a law could deepen the political conflict.

One question that remains unanswered is why such a proposal was made in the first place. Did Seree have a political motive? Was it a case of personal political ambition?

Even if his motives were sincere and not self-interested, he cannot escape the accusation of political naivety. After all, the political conflict was not confined to protest leaders, and granting them an amnesty of sorts in exchange for their exit from politics would not put an end to the conflict.

Many ordinary people are also involved in the political turmoil, whose roots lie in fundamental differences of opinion on matters of national importance. While those differences remain unsettled, reconciliation will never be reached. And efforts like Seree’s won’t help get us to that destination.

attayuth@nationgroup.com

The move is expected to trigger further investigation into possible money laundering activities and tax evasion in various countries.

President Vladimir Putin had already been placed in the spotlight after a close associate of the Russian leader was named in the initial leak. He will likely be joined by politicians from several other countries after probes into the latest data dump by the ICIJ.

The database also contains a total 1,413 names with Thai addresses, most belonging to wealthy businesspeople, celebrities and former politicians or their dependants.

The list also includes a slew of expatriates resident in Thailand, especially in major resort provinces such as Phuket.

The Anti-Money Laundering Organisation (AMLO), Revenue Department, and National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) are responsible for leading the response. AMLO previously revealed it is probing 16 Thai names in the initial Panama Papers leak, including former politicians and businessmen, for possible violations of the anti-money laundering law.

However, no guilt has been established at this stage.

Money laundering and other criminal activities aside, setting up offshore shell companies is a common practice among wealthy individuals and companies as a means to avoid or minimise their tax burden.

Most individuals who qualify as “super-rich” are keen to hide their assets, and the services of offshore legal and banking specialists such as Mossack Fonseca serve their objectives.

By exposing the huge scale of tax evasion worldwide, the whistle-blowers hope their efforts will also help create an agenda for governments around the globe, especially those in the developed world, to seek new measures to plug this gaping loophole.

High-net-worth individuals generally face a correspondingly high burden of tax on their income and other assets, and this has naturally led to widespread onshore tax evasion.

More startling are the cases of corrupt politicians who resort to setting up offshore shell companies to manage their ill-gotten wealth. This practice is also favoured by criminals seeking to launder money from illegal activities abroad, including funds from narcotics and human trafficking.

In addition, most multinational companies, especially those among the world’s largest corporations, have long benefited from the legal loopholes, allowing them to book billions of dollars in profits abroad to avoid paying hefty taxes back home.

In the case of Thailand, the Revenue Department will have to step up its monitoring on the tax records of individuals and companies named in the Panama Papers.

Dubbed the world’s biggest-ever leak of its kind, the database provided by the ICIJ is sending shock waves around the world for the privileged elite and companies.

In Thailand, those affected are mainly well-known millionaires and billionaires as well as familiar companies from virtually all major categories of business and industry.

Relatives and spouses of former politicians, sport and other celebrities are also feeling the heat of the spotlight.

While the legal consequences are not yet clear at this stage, those named in the Panama Papers will find it hard to avoid social ramifications.

Nophakhun@nationgroup.com

On August 7, voters will make their decisions on two questions. The first is whether you are for or against the charter draft. The second is whether you agree that unelected senators should be empowered to join elected MPs in voting to select the prime minister.

The referendum process seems to have been muddled from the start.

Departing from tradition by incorporating more than one question has brought confusion, which has grown over the process of explaining and helping voters understand the draft’s content.

The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) assigned the military to help disseminate information on the draft to voters. But the Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC) has been tasked with publicising the draft’s details while the National Legislative Assembly has to explain why it wants a joint parliamentary vote for the PM.

However, where the CDC is facing resistance – particularly in strongholds of the anti-coup movement – it has co-opted provincial officials who did not write the draft to help explain its contents. As such, the process of conveying the information is proving difficult.

On top of that, the referendum act that came into effect last month contains tough regulations about voters expressing their opinions. The NCPO is threatening to file lawsuits against those who cause chaos or violence during the referendum campaign, with penalties of up to 10 years in jail for those found guilty.

The harshest regulations and penalties are reserved for people who express opinions on the draft that differ from those of the powers-that-be.

A fair and effective referendum can only occur if voters receive adequate information on both the draft content and the additional question on selecting a PM. Only with that information can they make informed choices in the ballot booths.

Unfortunately, instead of trying to ensure effective dissemination, the NCPO is focused on arresting its opponents.

Meanwhile a shortage of information, strict rules on campaigning and too many barriers in place against public expression threaten to sway voters’ decisions in an unhealthy way.

The lack of information and restrictions on asking questions could lead to misunderstanding and encourage emotional reactions rather than reasoned choices based on the substance of the draft.

Voters can accept that the NCPO wants to maintain peace and order during the campaign, but many will not tolerate tight restriction of public communication that seems to violate basic rights.

Calls for more open debate have spread from the local to the international stage and now threaten to damage Thailand’s reputation.

Of course, the NCPO might be successful in maintaining order with such tough measures, and the draft may pass the referendum. But the legitimacy of the resulting constitution would definitely be questioned.

Legitimacy can only be achieved when different voices are heard.

With three months to go before voters enter booths, the junta has a duty to lift the climate of fear and help create a more inclusive atmosphere.

Assuming, of course, that it wants the draft charter to pass and be accepted as legitimate

Initially, the depositor protection limit was reduced from Bt50 million to the current level of Bt25 million. This was then set to fall to Bt1 million on August 11.

But that plan has changed with the latest government announcement, which laid down new rules covering the period from August 11 this year to August 11, 2020.

The new rules will see a gradual reduction in depositor protection, to Bt15 million from August 11 this year to August 10, 2018, then Bt10 million from August 11, 2018 to August 10, 2019, and Bt5 million from August 11, 2019 to August 10, 2020.

The official reason given for the change was that it would allow depositors more time to understand the new rules so they wouldn’t withdraw their deposits in a panic.

There were a total 2.4 million savings accounts in the country as of February, according to the latest Bank of Thailand data. Of these, only 60,000 accounts contained more than Bt1 million.

The Deposit Protection Agency says 98.5 per cent of Thai savings accounts contain less than Bt1 million.

So, in going back on its plans to protect the highest-value accounts, is the government protecting the rich?

Many high-income earners shun banks and their modest deposit rates of 1 per cent per annum or less (or a maximum 2 per cent for fixed deposits). They can get potentially much higher returns by investing elsewhere – in mutual funds, properties, gold, stocks, bonds, debentures and other financial products.

Almost two million accounts would have gone unaffected by the drop in deposit protection to Bt1 million.

But with its decision to extend protection for higher-value deposits, the government faces accusations of pampering the “lazy money” lying in banks.

Looking at the intent of the law, deposit protection is designed to assure depositors they will receive their savings back if their bank should collapse and have its licence removed.

On the other hand, the government won’t have to bear too much burden in the event of a repeat of the disastrous financial crisis of 1997.

Under the deposit protection law, people can diversify to minimise risk by depositing their money in up to 35 legitimate financial institutions (30 commercial banks, two finance companies and three credit fonciers). An individual with Bt30 million could deposit Bt1 million in each, and thus receive legal protection for all their savings.

That’s enough, we think.

Moreover, the deposits eligible for legal protection cover savings and fixed accounts, depository receipts, co-deposit accounts and deposit accounts for other persons.

Some financial analysts reckon the 2-per-cent interest rate plus protection guarantee is preferable to the risk entailed in putting your money into other investments given current global financial volatility that could get worse.

After all, it is the wealthiest one per cent who are most vulnerable to the government’s plans on deposit protection, and their voice is always louder.

sasithorn@nationgroup.com